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Humanitarian aid is often delivered in difficult circumstances, at a rapid pace and is expected to serve 
various and competing needs. When done well, humanitarian relief operations have the capacity to 
save thousands of lives. In almost all humanitarian crises, the needs of affected populations far 
exceed resources available. It is crucial, therefore, that humanitarian assistance focuses on providing 
as many people as possible with the help they need. 
Evaluations can ask important questions about operations, outcomes and the broader humanitarian 
system. These studies are vital to capture learning and improve future responses. This is the first ODE 
evaluation that has examined humanitarian assistance and I found that more came out of the 
evaluation than I expected.  
Overall this is a very strong evaluation report which, although focused on a slow-onset crisis, makes 
recommendations that are widely applicable and should change Australia’s humanitarian 
programming for the better. This report identifies many strengths of the Australian response to the 
humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa in 2011. At the time, humanitarian operations in severely 
affected areas were fraught with danger and were extremely difficult. Australia was a new player 
compared to other donors with years of experience in the region and a much larger presence on the 
ground. The Australian aid program responded quickly with a sound program, despite limited capacity 
and experience in the region. This should be commended. 
The speed and flexibility of operations were notable strengths of the Australian response. Australian 
funds clearly saved lives; however, the results depended on more than funds alone. Effective 
coordination of response efforts is a persistent challenge for the global humanitarian system. 
Australia’s role in influencing implementing partners and coordinating important aspects of the 
overall system increased the effectiveness of Australian assistance, and the overall international 
response. The report shows that among the small numbers of staff at post, there were obviously some 
heroes, and they did a great job.  
Another clear finding is the need for funded agencies to improve reporting on activities and results. 
The reporting is essential for learning and to ensure informed decisions are made. The evaluation 
recommendations in areas such as these are designed to improve the effectiveness of Australian 
humanitarian assistance in the future.  
Finally, the evaluation rightly highlights the complexity of disaster situations, which are growing in 
number and severity and will continue to pose a challenge for Australia in their commitment to 
supporting humanitarian work in the Indo-Pacific.  
 
Jim Adams 
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Executive summary  
This evaluation examines the effectiveness of Australian humanitarian assistance provided in 2011 in 
response to a crisis in the Horn of Africa (HoA), a region well known for its chronic vulnerability. This 
evaluation identifies how the Australian aid program can improve the effectiveness of responses to 
future slow-onset crises.  
Context 
In 2011, a devastating famine in the riverine areas of south-central Somalia killed an estimated 
257 500 people, about half of whom were under five years old. Drought was one of the main causes 
of the crisis, along with rising food prices. Neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia, which were also affected 
by drought, had to cope with food shortages as well as refugee flows from Somalia. The other main 
causes of the crisis were armed conflict and the actions of the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, which 
controlled much of the most seriously affected areas. It was estimated that, in 2011, about 
13.3 million people across the HoA needed multiple forms of assistance.  
The Australian response 
Australia contributed a total of $112 million to the international humanitarian effort in 2011. This 
made it Australia’s largest-ever international disaster relief operation in financial terms. Australia was 
one of the top five country donors to the crisis in absolute terms and as a proportion of gross 
domestic product. The scale of Australia’s response was in keeping with the magnitude of the crisis.  
Main findings 
Australia, like other countries, did not commit major funding for the crisis until after famine was 
declared in Somalia in July 2011. Many deaths could have been avoided with earlier action. Australia, 
along with other donors, needs to reflect on how to initiate responses before crises escalate. 
Once famine was declared, Australia led early calls for the international community to respond and 
was one of the first donors to make major financial commitments. Australia’s diplomacy and early-
mover example helped make other donors willing to accept the risks of providing assistance in areas 
controlled by Al-Shabaab. This leadership is to Australia’s credit. 
Priorities  
The main priority for the Australian aid program was to get food assistance to affected people in 
Somalia and provide assistance for refugees. This made strategic sense, because the epicentre of the 
famine was in southern Somalia, where access to food was the critical issue, and the crisis caused a 
large-scale movement of people within and away from Somalia.  
8 
The Australian aid program in Nairobi invested significant effort in getting donors and aid agencies to 
work together. In particular, the Nairobi team supported the overall United Nations (UN) official in 
charge, the humanitarian coordinator, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA). Australia also helped to push for better coordination of food aid, advocating strongly for the 
food security ‘cluster’ to become operational and effective.  
Partners 
Australian assistance was delivered exclusively through partners. UN agencies received the bulk of 
the funding—some $87.5 million, with a heavy prioritisation of the World Food Programme (WFP), 
which received $57 million. The remaining $24.5 million went to the Australian Red Cross Society and 
19 Australian-based non-government organisations (NGOs).  
Australian NGOs were funded through two mechanisms that had not been previously used: the 
Humanitarian Partnership Agreement (HPA) and the Dollar for Dollar Initiative. Both schemes had 
strengths and weaknesses. A notable achievement of the HPA was the rapid, efficient disbursal of 
funds to the preselected group of NGOs. Strengths of the Dollar for Dollar Initiative were engaging the 
public and increasing the level of funding for the crisis. However, the Australian NGOs funded through 
both schemes were not always those organisations best placed to provide the most needed 
assistance. Another drawback of the Dollar for Dollar Initiative was that it took considerable time to 
establish so that funds were not available until after the peak of the crisis. The large number of 
partner organisations also made it administratively burdensome.  
Results 
The speed with which funding was disbursed following commitments being made and strong 
alignment with the principles of good humanitarian donorship are notable strengths of Australian 
assistance. Australia’s fast, effective and well-regarded response is a testament to the hard work of 
and incredible dedication of aid program staff both in Nairobi and Canberra.  
With WFP as its main partner, Australian aid did not reach the neediest areas as quickly as intended 
because the agency was blocked from working in these areas by Al-Shabaab, and WFP took time to 
scale up its operations. Some agencies funded by Australia did manage to deliver humanitarian 
assistance in the worst-affected areas at the peak of the crisis. The International Committee of the 
Red Cross fed more than a million people. The UN Children’s Fund, UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization and some NGOs provided assistance using cash transfers. These transfers were a major 
success in attracting traders, bringing down food prices and giving people more choice overall.  
Largely due to Australian support, WFP became operational in Mogadishu, where a large number of 
internally displaced persons had gathered. WFP used Australia-funded food to help famine victims 
directly. Australian funds assisted refugees in Kenya through both the WFP and the UN High 
Commission for Refugees.  
Most funding was focused on food assistance and support for displaced people as intended, but all 
sectors were supported. The severity of the crisis meant that affected people had needed multiple 
forms of assistance—including water, shelter, protection, livelihood support and cash. All sectors were 
supported by Australian assistance as a result of funding to NGOs.  
After the international response scaled up the combined efforts of the major donors (including 
Australia) and agencies led to dramatic reductions in mortality rates in Somalia. The exact number of 
lives saved by Australian assistance is hard to estimate, but it is clear that many people, and possibly 
millions of people, received much needed assistance. 
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Lessons 
This evaluation has found many positive aspects to the Australian response, as well as some 
significant lessons.  
The first major lesson is that the response needed more support internally. Australia is well rehearsed 
in responding to sudden-onset natural disasters nearer home with rapid deployment of expert teams 
and administrators. In the HoA, the workload involved in using partners was underestimated. 
Providing assistance in complex conflict-affected areas needs highly technical responses and liaising 
with multiple funding agencies, which requires active management and close monitoring. In the 
future, a set of administrative procedures for managing these spikes in ‘slow onset-crises’ responses 
need to be established as they have been for rapid-onset disasters. This would mean rapidly 
developing a strategy and staffing plan, as well as making sure responsibilities and priorities are 
clear. 
Recommendation 1 
DFAT should develop procedures for responding to slow-onset humanitarian crises.  
 
The second clear lesson is that the reporting of partners needs to be improved. Implementing 
partners, particularly UN agencies, did not consistently provide adequate reporting on what they did 
and achieved with Australian funds. Reporting requirements for NGOs were more stringent than those 
for UN agencies, but both need to provide better information.  
Recommendation 2 
DFAT should develop clear measures of success for humanitarian action and ensure that funding 
agreements with partners include specific reporting against these measures.  
 
The third lesson is that humanitarian expertise needs to be enhanced in DFAT to exploit international 
humanitarian knowledge and networks. This should improve how valuable resources are used and 
provide greater stewardship of humanitarian responses. 
Recommendation 3 
DFAT should continue to build humanitarian cadre and expertise.  
 
The fourth lesson is the need to be flexible and innovative in ways that improve effectiveness. For 
example, options for cash-transfer programming, which was effective in the crisis, should be routinely 
considered by DFAT. The use of UN-pooled funds could be further exploited, especially if the speed 
with which UN agencies disburse funds can be improved. 
Recommendation 4 
DFAT should continue to improve the quality, timeliness and focus of its operations, changing 
emphasis as evidence proves the efficacy of new or amended approaches.  
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The fifth lesson is that mechanisms to fund NGOs could be improved. Funding mechanisms need to 
be able to target partner organisations best suited to respond, and also be administratively efficient. 
Australia should be prepared to fund well-placed NGOs that do not have an Australian base. 
Additionally, any scheme to engage public support should be planned in advance so funding can be 
provided in a timely fashion.  
Recommendation 5 
DFAT should develop strategies to better mobilise resources in response to slow-onset humanitarian 
crises. 
 
The sixth lesson is that Australia should improve liaison with other donors and organisations when 
working in regions outside the traditional geographic focuses of the aid program. This means having 
experts on the ground, in embassies or working with partners. Having experts in liaison roles in key 
‘at-risk’ areas or regions is a good investment for humanitarian responses. 
Recommendation 6 
DFAT should increase humanitarian liaison capacity in regions outside the traditional geographic 
focuses of the aid program.  
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Management response  
The evaluation of Australia’s response to the Horn of Africa humanitarian crisis, 2011 was a well-
planned and executed review and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) thanks the 
review team for their extensive work—the review is of a high standard. DFAT welcomes the review 
team’s articulation of the achievements and its frankness in expressing some of the challenges 
encountered in the Horn of Africa response. While the review examines assistance provided in the 
Horn of Africa, DFAT considers that the review and its recommendations provide useful lessons to 
inform both future humanitarian responses and aid programming more broadly than the Horn of 
Africa region and the management responses are framed in this light.  
Overall, DFAT welcomes the findings of the evaluation and agrees or partially agrees with all the 
recommendations and has already made some progress in addressing key findings. DFAT makes 
particular note of observations that suggest that most of DFAT’s current procedures are geared 
towards delivery of humanitarian assistance in the context of rapid-onset crises in the Indo-Pacific 
region.  
DFAT agrees there is a need for clearer triggers to activate stand-by mechanisms and funding for 
rapid-onset crises in protracted settings. The challenge of committing funding prior to declaration of a 
disaster is shared with many other donors. However, as the review team recognised, Australia 
responded appropriately once the disaster was declared. The Australian Government responded 
quickly and showed strong leadership in marshalling support from other donors. DFAT will build on 
this positive finding and provide greater clarity to our partners in the global humanitarian system 
about the scale and scope of Australian support in slow-onset and protracted crises beyond the Indo-
Pacific region. 
Since the Horn of Africa crisis, DFAT has undertaken development programming in the area of food 
security, economic recovery, and resilience in Africa to reduce the likelihood of large numbers of 
people falling back into humanitarian crises when shocks hit. Australia has maintained its focus on a 
number of priority humanitarian situations where there are high levels of need and we have been able 
to build on assistance provided in previous years. 
The way Australian aid is managed and delivered has gone through significant changes since the Horn 
of Africa response. DFAT assumed responsibility for providing advice to the government on aid policy 
and managing Australia’s overseas aid program on 1 November 2013, following the abolition of the 
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) as an Executive Agency. Integration will 
enable DFAT to better pursue Australia’s national interests by ensuring closer alignment and mutually 
reinforcing linkages among the government’s aid, foreign affairs and trade efforts. Integration will 
deliver efficiencies and strengthen our capacity to pursue our national interests abroad. Within this 
context, the unique challenges of humanitarian crises have been recognised through the retention of 
a stand-alone Humanitarian Division. The Humanitarian Division will maintain its level of specialised 
capabilities across the spectrum of humanitarian activities, from risk reduction and resilience building 
to response and recovery.  The Humanitarian Division provides advice, expertise and additional 
funding when necessary to help guide country program responses to humanitarian crises.
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Recommendation  Management response 
1. DFAT should develop procedures for 
responding to slow-onset humanitarian crises. 
i. A simple activation mechanism that 
identifies which section is in the lead 
and the likely level of financial 
commitment. 
ii. A strategy development process that 
sets priorities, targets specific 
outcomes, shapes the funding portfolio 
and identifies activities distinct from 
funding needed to increase the 
effectiveness of Australian assistance. 
iii. Key elements of a staffing plan with an 
appropriate surge capacity to ensure 
requisite human resources to deliver 
and monitor humanitarian assistance. 
The plan should include support for 
staff to deal with the stresses of their 
work, as well as monitoring of 
workloads and wellbeing of staff by 
individuals not involved in the 
response. 
Agreed DFAT’s Humanitarian Response Branch, in consultation with 
geographical Branches and Posts will develop guidelines to 
provide predictability for responses to escalations in slow-onset 
and protracted crises. These procedures will include guidance on: 
› how to determine which part of the department is to lead on 
protracted crisis responses 
› the process to develop strategies for responses to 
protracted crises 
› how to set priorities based on the strategic intent and likely 
financial commitment, and what key considerations should 
be taken into account if that strategic intent changes 
› what procedures will be put in place to provide adequate 
support to staff on desk and at post and monitor workloads 
and wellbeing. 
Procedures for responding to humanitarian crises have been 
strengthened since the Horn of Africa crisis in 2011: 
› All officers deployed for humanitarian emergency responses 
are subject to psychological and medical screening prior to 
deployment and on return. Support is extended to officers 
working on responses in Canberra also to ensure staff are 
adequately supported during periods of high workload or 
stress. 
› Officers deployed to posts or the field are provided with a 
detailed terms of reference prior to their deployment to 
ensure the parameters of their work are well understood, 
the security environment is appropriate and work health 
safety risks are identified with mitigation strategies in place. 
However, many of these procedures apply to rapid-onset 
disasters in the Indo-Pacific region. DFAT will examine how these 
procedures may be adapted to better prepare and deploy surge 
capacity in other contexts, in line with the government’s strategic 
intent. 
2. DFAT should develop clear measures of 
success for humanitarian action and ensure 
that funding agreements with partners include 
specific reporting against these measures. 
i. Identify measureable indicators for 
strategic outcomes, such as food 
security, protection and resilience. 
ii. Work with partners to develop better 
outcome monitoring systems and to 
ensure more equitable outcomes for 
ethnic minority groups, women and 
children. 
iii. Set out reporting requirements in 
formal agency-level grant agreements 
with implementing partners, especially 
United Nations agencies. This reporting 
should include detailed financial 
accounting, as well as specific 
reporting on outputs and outcomes 
achieved. 
iv. Work with key partners to develop 
thinking about value for money in 
humanitarian action. Consider 
developing a ‘library’ of costs that can 
be used as benchmarks for 




Agreed The Australian Government’s development policy—Australian aid: 
promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability—will 
guide the allocation of aid and drive reforms to the way Australian 
aid is managed at the country, sectoral and global levels.  
Linked to this policy, the Making Performance Count performance 
framework will improve aid program performance, value for 
money and results. 
By December 2014, DFAT will review standard reporting clauses 
and formats for Humanitarian Partnership Agreement (HPA) 
partners, the Australian Red Cross (ARC) and deployed Australian 
experts including medical teams, RedR Australia, DFAT Rapid 
Response Team (RRT) members and Australian Civilian Corps 
(ACC) deployees.  
DFAT will continue to advocate for greater disaggregation of data 
by multilateral partners. 
In negotiating agreements with UN partners, DFAT will seek to 
include clearer reporting requirements, bearing in mind that 
Australia has a commitment to harmonise reporting through the 
Good Humanitarian Donorship process. 
DFAT will also encourage UN partners to publish International Aid 
Transparency Initiative (IATI)-compliant data to strengthen 
transparency of humanitarian aid flows globally. 
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3. DFAT should continue to build humanitarian 
cadre and expertise. 
i. Increase in-house knowledge in key 
areas that are essential to understanding 
and responding to slow-onset crises, 
notably early warning, early action, 
resilience and multiyear funding. 
ii. Identify the most appropriate types and 
level of technical specialism and niche 
roles for the Australian aid program in 
chronic food and protracted conflict 
emergencies, and improve and increase 
skills in these areas. 
iii. Continue to invest in policy and advocacy 
capacity to engage with the humanitarian 
system, contributing to its overall 
effectiveness. 
iv. Ensure there are sufficient geographical 
humanitarian positions to be prepared 
for spikes in crises. 
v. Adapt surge-capacity arrangements to 
bring in humanitarian skills to support 
programs dealing with slow-onset 
emergencies at short notice.. 
Agreed DFAT will continue to support the development of humanitarian 
expertise as an important part of maintaining Australian response 
capacity in rapid, slow-onset and protracted crises. 
Since 2011, DFAT has:   
› engaged a humanitarian adviser 
› established a stand-alone Humanitarian Division 
› maintained a pool of trained staff able to deploy at short 
notice 
› established a period offer to access specialist logistics 
services 
› built a register of 514 ACC deployees 
› supported the international accreditation of two Australian 
urban search and rescue teams 
› trained a national cadre of Australian Medical Assistance 
› supported over 200 RedR specialists, many of whom have 
been deployed to protracted crises such as South Sudan, 
Myanmar, Chad and the Central African Republic. 
DFAT also provides specialist training programs for key staff 
involved in the management of crises, as well as specific regional 
training for the Pacific and South-east Asia each year.  Where 
individual posts or divisions are identified as requiring further 
capacity development, the Humanitarian Division provides 
additional support to ensure a greater depth of knowledge (e.g. in 
January 2014, specific training for the Manila post was identified 
as a key lesson learned from the Typhoon Haiyan Response and 
was delivered in May 2014). 
The Humanitarian Division will incorporate protracted crises as a 
theme for the Humanitarian Focal Point network. This will 
increase in-house knowledge around operating in protracted 
crises. Geographic programs and staff at Posts will be 
encouraged to share lessons and seek advice on common issues, 
such as early warning signals, multi-year humanitarian funding, 
remote monitoring and humanitarian reform in these contexts. 
DFAT agrees in principle that there is a need for further support 
to geographic programs and staff at Posts and will examine 
options to improve surge-capacity. This could include specialist 
training programs for staff who may be involved in the 
management of crises, as well as specific regional training.   
4. DFAT should continue to improve the quality, 
timeliness and focus of its operations, changing 
emphasis as evidence proves the efficacy of 
new or amended approaches. 
i. Routinely consider options for cash-
transfer programming and ensure 
partners consider this as a first rather 
than a last option. Ensure cash is 
targeted at women where appropriate. 
ii. Devolve decision-making to 
humanitarian and geographical 
professionals on technical issues 
where possible, and to Post and field 
teams where there is sufficient 
capacity. 
iii. Continue to investigate with others how 
early warning data can be translated 
into early and appropriate action. 
Agreed Australia will continue to be an effective and principled 
humanitarian donor and will help build the resilience of countries 
and communities to disasters, conflict and economic shocks. 
DFAT will continue to invest in innovations that improve the 
quality of DFAT’s humanitarian assistance.  
In line with the Australian Government’s focus on economic 
diplomacy, DFAT will advocate for increased private sector 
investment in the humanitarian sector in international fora, 
including the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and the 2015 
Hyogo Framework for Action II. 
DFAT will deliver on our Good Humanitarian Donorship 
commitments to provide humanitarian assistance in ways that 
are supportive of recovery and long-term development as well as 
maintain human dignity. 
In line with international best practice, DFAT will continue to 
promote awareness of the use of cash transfers in crisis 
situations and the scope for channelling assistance to crisis-
affected populations through long-term social protection 
schemes. 
DFAT will harness the opportunities provided by the closer 
alignment of Australia’s foreign and development policy portfolios 




5. DFAT should develop strategies to better 
mobilise resources in response to slow-onset 
humanitarian crises. 
i. In partnership with Australian Council 
for International Development and the 
private sector, explore innovative public 
fundraising and outreach that builds on 
the success of the Dollar for Dollar 
Initiative. 
ii. Examine options for a mechanism like 
the Humanitarian Partnership 
Agreement that can be adapted to 
different contexts and geographic 
locations. 
iii. Continue to use pooled funding–type 
arrangements such as the United 
Nations Common Humanitarian Fund, 
but work with the United Nations to 
speed up disbursal. 
iv. Develop new mechanisms, or modify 
existing ones, to fund non-government 
organisations directly, including those 
without an Australian base, where they 
are clearly the best placed to deliver 
lifesaving assistance. 
v. Ensure that the speed of disbursal 
seen in the Horn of Africa crisis is 
maintained. 
Agreed DFAT acknowledges that there is significant scope to mobilise 
resources beyond the aid program. DFAT will engage with the 
private sector and the Australian Council for International 
Development to identify areas of mutual interest that might be 
harnessed to complement Australian Government funding in the 
event of slow-onset crises. 
DFAT will also promote public-private sector partnerships within 
the framework of global dialogues, such as the 2015 Hyogo 
Framework for Action II and the 2016 World Humanitarian 
Summit, to increasingly harness the experience, ideas and 
resources of the private sector in support of global humanitarian 
systems and action. 
DFAT notes the concerns regarding slow disbursement of pooled 
funds and will continue to advocate for more streamlined and 
accountable processes in fora such as the Central Emergency 
Relief Fund and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. 
The HPA mechanism will remain the primary channel providing for 
humanitarian funding through non-government organisations 
(NGO) in rapid onset crises. DFAT will continue to examine, on a 
case-by-case basis, whether this mechanism is suitable for slow-
onset and protracted crises.  
In selecting NGO partners to respond to a specific emergency, 
DFAT will consider their effectiveness and capacity to deliver an 
appropriate, effective, timely, efficient and accountable response. 
Australian NGOs will remain valuable partners in Australia’s 
humanitarian programs but local and international NGOs may be 
preferred where they are best placed to respond. 
6. DFAT should increase humanitarian liaison 
capacity in regions outside the traditional 
geographic focuses of the aid program. 
i. Strengthen working relationships with 
humanitarian counterparts in other 
donor missions to identify division of 
labour opportunities, including options 
for delegated cooperation and/or 
shared resources. 
ii. Invest in coordination at a country 
level, either through direct hosting 
arrangements (as with the donor 
coordination for Somalia) or through 





needs to be 
considered in 








DFAT will continue to foster and demonstrate humanitarian 
leadership and support crisis responses in regions where 
Australia has an enduring interest. This will include partnering 
with multilateral organisations, regional organisations, other 
donors and partner countries to extend our capacity to deliver 
effective humanitarian responses. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose  
This evaluation assesses the effectiveness of Australia’s response to the food security and refugee 
crisis in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya in 2011, known as the Horn of Africa (HoA) crisis. The purpose 
of this evaluation is to identify how to improve the effectiveness of Australian humanitarian 
assistance to future slow-onset crises. The areas of enquiry were: 
› how Australian responded 
› how Australian assistance was delivered 
› how well the needs of affected people were met 
› achievements of the Australian response. 
1.2 Methodology  
Process 
The evaluation aimed to be participatory while maintaining rigour and evidence standards. The first 
step was to develop an evaluation plan that outlined the methods and timeframe. This was circulated 
to internal stakeholders for comment and was subject to scrutiny by the Independent Evaluation 
Committee. 
Interviews with stakeholders were conducted face to face in Canberra, Melbourne and Nairobi, or by 
telephone. These interviews were complemented by an intensive process of collecting, sifting and 
analysing reports, the academic and grey literature, and other relevant material.  
The evaluation sought to triangulate findings through a variety of means. This included a review of 
evaluative material examining the performance of the Australian aid program and implementing 
partners, as well as general findings relating to areas of the response that Australia funded. The 
analytical process included an interrogation of financial data with a view to understanding sector and 
geographic coverage, and for collating and codifying results data. Interviews were written up and 
analysed for patterns and common themes. An initial feedback session was held in Nairobi and a 
validation workshop presented initial findings in Canberra to begin the process of developing 
recommendations.  
Evidence 
Interviews focused on staff in the Australian aid program, implementing partners and donor 
organisations (Table 1). The interviews were semi structured, loosely following the four areas of 
enquiry. They were a strong source of evidence. People were generally candid and frank, and 
appeared comfortable to share all forms of information verbally. Interviews provided a high degree of 
consistent information, with major themes emerging quickly. Workshops were held with staff from the 
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Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) to develop recommendations, and focus group 
discussions were undertaken with beneficiary communities in northern Kenya.  
Table 1 Number and type of interviews 
 Organisation Number of people interviewed or consulted 
Canberra and Melbourne 
AusAID (now DFAT) Africa Branch (5), Humanitarian Preparedness and Response Branch (8), other (5) 
NGOs Australian Council for International Development (1), Australian Red Cross (2), CARE (2), 
Oxfam (2), Save the Children (1), Plan (2), World Vision International (2) 
Nairobi / Wajir 
AusAID (now DFAT) Nairobi Post (5 interviewed, another 5 included in briefing or feedback sessions) 
NGOs Arid Land Development Focus (2), CARE (2), Caritas (10), Oxfam (7), Plan (3), Save the 
Children (5), Wajir South Development Association (2), World Vision International (2) 
UN UN Children’s Fund (2), UN Food and Agriculture Organization (2), UN High Commission for 
Refugees, Kenya (2), UN High Commission for Refugees, Somalia (2), UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (1), UN World Food Programme Kenya (9), UN World Food 
Programme Somalia (2) 
Red Cross International Committee of the Red Cross (2), International Federation of the Red Cross (2) 
Donors Denmark (1), Department for International Development, United Kingdom (2), European 
Community Humanitarian Office (2), Netherlands (1), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, 
United States (2) 
Beneficiaries Three focus groups of beneficiaries from Oxfam (12), Save the Children (5) and UN World Food 
Programme (15) 
Total 137 people interviewed or consulted 
AusAID = Australian Agency for International Development; DFAT = Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; NGO = non-government 
organisation; UN = United Nations 
The secondary data analysis used two main sources of information—agency reporting and external 
material relating either to the HoA crisis or to the international aid operation. This latter category 
included evaluations and academic literature (Table 2).  
A number of ways were used to review the secondary data. A trawl of the academic literature and 
general evaluative publications was undertaken to draw out key general lessons appropriate to 
countries, sectors or agencies, and to look for specific mentions of Australia or AusAID. The 
documentation provided by the Australian aid program and its partners was reviewed to inform the 
narrative and factual base for this evaluation, as well as for any pertinent lessons. Reports of, 
financial allocations and beneficiary numbers were reviewed to compile new analyses of results 
including where funds were spent and how many people were assisted.  
To make evaluative judgements, the extensive humanitarian experience of the team and their 
knowledge of the HoA crisis were used, along with the evidence gathered in the course of this 
evaluation. For details of the strength of evidence in each of the areas of enquiry, see Table 3. 
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Table 2 Type of secondary data review 
Type  Number of documents 
Academic and grey literature  81 
Review of relevant evaluations 32 
Australian aid program and implementing partner reports 99 
Total 212 
 
Table 3 Strength of the evidence 
Area of enquiry Data source Analysis Strength of 
evidence 
The Australian response › stakeholder interviews 
› internal reports 
› workshops 
› literature 
› evaluation reports 
Internal paper trail clear; 
interviews consistent; good body 
of literature; timeliness, 
influencing and staffing issues 
clear 
Strong 
Delivery of Australian 
assistance 
› stakeholder interviews 
› internal reports 
› workshops 
Internal paper trail clear; 
interviews consistent; 
timeliness, influencing and 
staffing issues clear 
Strong 




› beneficiary focus groups 
› literature 
› agency reports 
Interviews, focus groups and 
documentation consistent; 
timeliness, influencing and 
staffing issues clear 
Adequate 
Achievements of the Australian 
response 
› interviews  
› beneficiary focus groups  
› literature 
› agency reports 
Few real facts on outcomes or 
impact beyond the recent 
mortality study,1 value for 
money unclear due to data 
limitations and definitions 
Weak 
Limitations 
The evaluation was mostly based on secondary data. The strength of the findings was dependent on 
the quality and quantity of data provided, which was less than ideal. There were significant gaps in 
data and information. Some of this is understandable given the context, because it is difficult to 
monitor and collect data in humanitarian and conflict situations. Deficiencies in reporting, however, 
also stem from poor practice in the humanitarian sector, which traditionally has not prioritised 
accountability (either to donors or beneficiaries) and has not invested in rigorous measurement of 
effectiveness. Some agencies were reluctant to generate additional information for this evaluation. 
The United Nations (UN) system proved the most problematic in terms of providing both budgetary 
analysis and numbers of people reached or assisted. This was primarily because the reporting that 
Australia requires from these agencies is minimal. Since UN agencies received the bulk of funds, 
evidence on results is weak. 
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2 Context 
2.1 The 2011 Horn of Africa crisis 
The 2011 Horn of Africa (HoA) crisis had devastating effects on Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. Its 
impact was greatest in Somalia, where the catastrophic combination of drought and conflict took 
place against a backdrop of progressive deterioration in environmental and social conditions.  
The crisis grew in the very heartland of modern international humanitarian action, around its oldest 
and most intense operational hub—Nairobi. Since the 1970s, humanitarian, political and military 
operations have responded to a succession of conflicts, droughts, famines and refugee crises across 
the HoA. The humanitarian community is probably more entrenched in this region than in any other 
part of the world. This density of humanitarian capacity across the region explains why the crisis in 
Ethiopia and Kenya was so effectively managed in most areas. Paradoxically, it may also explain why 
the tragic famine that took shape in Somalia was initially so hard to see amid the conflict, chronic 
uncertainty and remote management that has characterised humanitarian action in Somalia for many 
years. 
The HoA crisis was not the only major international crisis in 2011–12. The Libya crisis was in full 
swing—international military intervention started in March 2011. The Syrian uprising also began in 
March 2011 and quickly deteriorated into civil war. More widely, the ‘Arab spring’ started in 
December 2010 and was continuing around the Middle East and North Africa. All these events 
demanded political, humanitarian and media attention that competed with the HoA crisis. However, in 
2011, no other event would result in as many deaths as the HoA crisis.  
2.2 Entrenched ecological and livelihood vulnerability 
The HoA has a long history of drought and increasing livelihood vulnerability resulting in long-term aid 
dependency. From 2010, specific global weather effects (La Niña) resulted in a number of poor and 
intermittent rains.2,3 This weather effect severely impacted on livelihoods, particularly in pastoral 
areas and the delicate riverine agricultural area of south-central Somalia.  
People in the affected areas have a mix of livelihoods including pastoralist, agro-pastoralist and 
farming. Pastoralist livelihoods had been under threat before the crisis, with increasing inequalities 
emerging within pastoralist groups. Some pastoralists adapted well, increasing their market linkages 
and trade with the Middle East. These pastoralist ‘winners’ stood in marked contrast to an increasing 
number of pastoralist ‘drop-outs’, forced out of a pastoralist livelihood by repeated shocks in recent 
years, and other pastoralist ‘losers’ who were just clinging on.4 Gender and socioeconomic inequality 
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are also entrenched across the region. This mix of factors required any humanitarian response to be 
highly sensitive to the different livelihoods, coping mechanisms and vulnerabilities.a  
When the crisis began, the international humanitarian community had developed a strong 
understanding of vulnerability and need in the region’s sedentary agricultural populations, largely 
through the household food economy model pioneered in the 1990s.5 This knowledge and practice 
was generally widespread through the humanitarian system in the region and championed by mega-
agencies like the United Nations (UN) World Food Programme (WFP) and UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO).  
Understanding of pastoralist livelihoods was largely confined to a niche group of international and 
local experts who had a sophisticated knowledge of pastoralist economies, adaptation and coping 
strategies. There were also strong ideas about what constituted timely and constructive aid to 
pastoralists.6 Several pastoralist experts were lobbying for increased and improved humanitarian 
response to pastoralist communities throughout 2011–12. This knowledge was not common across 
the humanitarian sector and had no champion in a mega-agency or major donor that would lead 
large-scale innovative aid for pastoralist people. Much livelihood degradation could have been 
prevented by better and larger pastoralist programming.  
2.3 Conflict and instability  
Political control of the Somali state has been violently contested for decades. Political Islam emerged 
to play a major role in Somalia’s conflict through the Islamic courts movement in the early 2000s and 
subsequently through Al-Shabaab and several other Islamist groups. Al-Shabaab is primarily a 
national movement, seeking to impose strict Sharia law and remove foreign influence. The movement 
has links to Al Qaeda,b which has given the conflict a strong ‘war-on-terror’ dynamic since 2001. 
Support for the Somali Transitional Federal Government (2007–12) and Federal Government of 
Somalia (since 2012) in the conflict with Al-Shabaab has come from the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the multicounty African union force. 
Endorsed and resourced by the UN, AMISOM also receives significant support from the United States, 
United Kingdom and European Union. These donors also invest considerable bilateral resources in 
attempts to limit Al-Shabaab. 
Throughout the crisis, and the critical years beforehand, AMISOM and Al-Shabaab were in conflict. 
This made international aid organisations fearful of being militarily targeted by Al-Shabaab or 
prosecuted in the United States.7 Sanction strategies were pursued by both sides. Al-Shabaab took 
strong measures to limit the number of ‘western’ aid agencies entering their territory, regarding them 
as potential spies. Aid agencies withdrew from parts of Somalia because of security threats and being 
banned by Al-Shabaab. Sanctions were implemented by the United States Government’s Office for 
Foreign Assets Control and the UN Security Council to stop Al-Shabaab gaining resources and 
increasing their political control. While an important element of counterterrorism activities and efforts 
to halt Al-Shabaab, the sanctions had a negative impact on food supply. The amount of food aid 
provided by the United States in 2011 was about one-tenth of that provided in 2009. 
                                                        
a  For an excellent distillation of evidence-based good practice in such emergencies, see Active Learning Network for 
Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action, Humanitarian action in drought-related emergencies, lessons 
paper, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2011.  
b  The Australian Government listed Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organisation on 22 August 2009 and 18 August 2012. The 
Government has noted the link between Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda, as confirmed by both organisations in a public 
announcement on 9 February 2012, see: www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/Al-
Shabaab.aspx. 
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2.4  The need for humanitarian assistance 
The crisis is rightly seen as a regional one, born of profound long-term livelihood vulnerability for 
millions of people and entrenched regional conflict. Conflicts within the region meant that an effective 
regional response was not possible and the need for humanitarian assistance was massive.  
The level of humanitarian need was continually revised upwards as the crisis unfolded throughout 
2011. The estimate grew to 13.3 million people in need of assistance across the region (Figure 1). Of 
the 4 million people in need of assistance in Somalia, 2.8 million were in the south. The epicentre of 
the crisis was the riverine areas of south-central Somalia, where the famine killed an estimated 
257 500 people, about half of whom were under five years old.8 
As the famine worsened, there was large-scale movement of people fleeing the worst-affected areas 
of Somalia. Some 167 000 people became displaced around Mogadishu. Many Somalis sought 
asylum in neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya. In Ethiopia, the crisis resulted in 4.6 million local people 
as well as 276 500 Somali refugees in need of assistance. In Kenya it was estimated that there were 
3.8 million local people, plus 598 000 Somali refugees in need of assistance.  
Food was clearly a priority area for humanitarian assistance but the severity of the crisis meant that 
affected people needed multiple forms of assistance. Water, shelter, protection, livelihood support 
and cash were all needed. Water shortages (for people and livestock) became extreme in the Somali 
region of Ethiopia, parts of northern Kenya and Somalia itself. As food prices rose and food aid access 
was blocked in Somalia, cash became an urgent priority (Box 1). Protection needs were high in 
Somalia, both for those in the worst-affected areas and for the large groups of displaced people, 
which were predominantly made up of women and children, who were forced to travelled long 
distances in search of assistance.  
 
New arrivals making their way to the refugee camps in Dadaab, Kenya, August 2011. Photo: Katie Drew, 
Save the Children 
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Figure 1 Food insecurity and numbers of people in need of assistance in the Horn of Africa, 
2011 
 
Source: Adapted from OCHA/FEWS NET East Africa: Drought Snapshots form July and December, 
http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/horn-africa-humanitarian-snapshot-16-dec-2011, 2011. 
Note: The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a measure of how bad food insecurity is. It uses a set of standard 
tools to classify the severity of food insecurity into five phases. The phases are determined from a broad range of measures 
which includes food consumption, livelihoods changes, nutritional status, and mortality. Context-specific and other factors 
such as food availability, vulnerability and hazards are also taken into account. The IPCs shown on the map are for July 




2.5 The context of humanitarian operations in Somalia 
The nature and quality of existing humanitarian capacity in the region played a critical role in how the 
crisis was managed. Capacity differed between the three countries concerned, with capacity being 
very limited in Somalia.c In 2011, Somalia had no effective central government. What governance 
there was tended to be clan led, based on the limited reach of the Somalia Transitional Federal 
Government around Mogadishu or very strong control by Al-Shabaab and foreign jihadist fighters in 
their territories. Security concerns and inaccessibility made delivery of humanitarian assistance in 
Somalia extremely challenging.  
As a result of security threats, the humanitarian response in the famine epicentre was mostly 
remotely managed. Humanitarian operations in Somalia rely on subcontracting implementation to 
local NGOs and business people, some of whom are former UN and NGO staff members. This informal 
network negotiates and delivers humanitarian aid on behalf of distant donors with little direct 
monitoring. Humanitarian operations in the crisis were led from Nairobi with occasional visits to meet 
implementing partners in Mogadishu, usually in the airport. This network is remarkable yet vulnerable. 
The situation was different in the Somali border regions of Puntland and Somaliland, where some 
direct management was possible. 
Humanitarian operations in the worst-affected areas of Somalia were impaired by the inability of 
agencies to secure consistent access. In the lead up to and during the crisis, many humanitarian 
agencies, including the UN WFP, were expelled by Al-Shabaab from territories under its control. 
Eventually Al-Shabaab bans affected 22 aid agencies.  
Aid agencies that did have access in Al-Shabaab–controlled areas were subjected to a system of 
‘regulation, taxation and surveillance’.9 In late 2009, Al-Shabaab imposed 11 conditions on aid 
agencies in south-central Somalia, ‘including payments of registration and security fees, the removal 
of all logos from agency vehicles and a ban on female employees’. The traditional approach of 
providing the bulk of assistance as food, shelter materials and other in-kind aid is always problematic 
in conflict-affected and highly insecure countries such as Somalia. Conditions imposed by Al-Shabaab 
made operations extremely difficult. Al-Shabaab tried to control the delivery of aid and in some cases 
insisted that ‘food distributions be carried out directly by Al-Shabaab officials or their proxies’.10 This 
led humanitarian agencies to explore innovative and more efficient ways of delivering aid.  
One such approach was the use of cash transfers (see Box 1). Cash transfers had been used in 
Somalia for many years before the 2011 crisis as a way to circumvent access and security challenges. 
At the time of the crisis, the use of cash transfers was highly politicised and there were concerns 
about security and corruption risks, including fear of diversion to Al-Shabaab or foreign jihadist 
fighters. Even though these concerns made some agencies reluctant to use cash transfers, other 
agencies felt that the conditions in Somalia were appropriate for the use of cash transfers. The 2011 
HoA crisis was, at the time, the largest ever delivery of cash transfers, with more than US$100 million 
in cash provided to beneficiaries in Somalia. 
Conclusion 
› The HoA crisis took place in an incredibly difficult political and operational context, and this 
should be considered when attempting to evaluate outcomes.   
                                                        
c  For an overview of regional humanitarian response, see H Slim, IASC real-time evaluation of the humanitarian response 
to the Horn of Africa drought crisis in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya—synthesis report, UN Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee, Geneva, 2012. 
23 
Box 1 Cash-transfer programming 
 
Providing cash relief in emergencies has a long history. Cash programming is usually delivered either 
through direct cash grants or by giving vouchers. It can be provided with or without conditions.11 Cash-
transfer programming is increasingly used as an alternative to in-kind humanitarian aid (such as food, 
shelter, medicine, household items). A good practice review by the Overseas Development Institute 
points out that cash transfers are ‘simply an instrument that can be used—when appropriate—to meet 
particular objectives in particular contexts and sectors of response’.12  
The advantages of cash transfers include: 
› They offer freedom of choice for beneficiaries as they can choose the commodities they want to 
consume. 
› They are generally less visible, have lower operational costs and are quicker to deploy than in-kind 
assistance. 
› If markets are already functioning, cash transfers can stimulate markets rather than inflate 
prices.13  
The possible disadvantages of cash transfers include: 
› They may be used to pay off debts, rather than purchase commodities.  
› Inflation of prices may occur when supply of food and items in markets is low. In these 
circumstances, food aid is more appropriate than cash.  
› The implementation may take some time as aid agencies need to set up the delivery process if it 
is not already in place before a disaster.  
› Delivery mechanisms require proof of identity to receive cash, which many poor and vulnerable 
people may not have or be able to obtain.  
In humanitarian situations, cash transfers are usually unconditional and are typically used by 
beneficiaries to address food security and nutrition issues.14 The proven success of cash transfers in 
some contexts has led United Nations (UN) agencies to expand their use of cash transfers and 
vouchers. In 2010, the UN World Food Programme targeted 4.2 million beneficiaries with 
35 programs valued at $140 million. Other UN agencies that had significant experience in the use of 
cash transfers at the time of the crisis included the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the United 
Nations Children’s Fund, and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. The challenge for UN 
agencies, non-government organisations, donors and governments is to determine when cash 
transfers are the most effective form of assistance.  
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3 The Australian response 
Key questions 
 
› Was the scale of Australia’s response appropriate? 
› What were the triggers for the crisis and were they appropriate?  
› What were the contextual and other constraints, and were these dealt with effectively?  
› What were the strategic priorities and were they appropriate? 
› Was the response to the crisis timely? 
› Did the breakdown of Australian assistance to countries and sectors align with strategic 
priorities? 
3.1 Scale of funding  
Australia contributed a total of $112 million to the Horn of Africa (HoA) crisis in 2011, which put 
Australia in the top five country donors, both in absolute terms and relative to gross domestic product 
(Figure 2). Australia does not have strong historic links to the HoA, nor is East Africa a region of 
primary geopolitical and commercial interests. It is to the credit of Australia that it responded to the 
HoA crisis—and Somalia in particular—at a level in keeping with the magnitude of the crisis, one of the 
worst this century has seen.  
Figure 2 Financial allocations to the HoA crisis made by country donors in 2011 in actual 
amounts (left) and as a percentage of gross domestic product (right) 
 
Conclusion 
› Australia’s response was in keeping with the scale of needs in the crisis. 
 



























3.2 Triggers and constraints 
The failure of the international humanitarian community to take early action in response to the crisis 
in the HoA is well documented in academic and policy literature.15 When the United Nations (UN) 
declared famine in Somalia in July 2011, the crisis was already severe.16 Many people died before 
funding was significantly increased in response to the declaration, with implementation of large-scale 
relief programs coming even later.  
Australia, like the vast majority of donors, responded to scale when famine was declared in Somalia in 
July. Nevertheless, documentation and interviews showed that the Nairobi Post and the Africa Section 
in Canberra identified early in 2011 that the situation was deteriorating and tried, with some success, 
to secure funding. In March 2011, $3 million was granted to the United Nations Common 
Humanitarian Fund for Somalia (CHF), run by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA). Other grants made in the run-up to the declaration of famine are listed in Table 4. A 
question for this evaluation is whether Australia should have made major funding commitments 
before the declaration of famine.  
The lateness of the international response is seen by many as an unacceptable failure of major 
donors and the UN, given they had clear and compelling evidence of how bad things were at the 
beginning of 2011.17 As a result of Somalia’s long civil war and its history of food insecurity, the 
international humanitarian system has developed a sophisticated monitoring and early warning 
system for famine. The two key components of this system are the Famine Early Warning System 
Network (FEWS NET), backed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and 
the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) hosted by the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) for Somalia. These monitor meteorological data, crop production, nutritional 
status, movement of people due to conflict or hunger, and other pertinent indicators.  
Table 4 Grants made in advance of the famine declaration 
Agency Amount Purpose Date 
provided 
Kenya 
United Nations (UN) World 
Food Programme $4 000 000 
To improve food security in the semi-arid areas of 
Kenya, and provide assistance to Somali and Sudanese 
refugees 
May 2011 
UN World Food Programme $1 000 000 
To improve food security in the semi-arid areas of 




UN Office for the 
Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
$3 000 000 To support high-priority humanitarian activities in Somalia March 2011 
Save the Children $1 163 000 
To develop and implement disaster risk-reduction 
activities in the drought-stricken region of Hiran in 
south-central Somalia, and to extend disaster risk 
reduction work with secondary school children and 




By early 2011, reports being produced by both FEWS NET and FSNAU warned of an impending crisis 
in Somalia.a Although these reports are technical and deal in probabilities rather than certainties, they 
made it clear that food shortages were severe. These warnings were recognised but not acted on for a 
number of reasons. Somalia had been ‘bad’ before and never tipped over into famine. Rains were 
seldom consistent. Warnings were often dire yet somehow ordinary Somali people have survived from 
year to year. The poor harvest towards the end of 2010 was expected to have been partly mitigated by 
the good one earlier in the year and Somalia’s extensive remittances. Additionally, agencies may have 
developed a habit of betting on the next rains.18 Donors were also wary of significant investment, 
since without a declaration of famine, it is hard to justify the prioritisation of scarce resources to one 
crisis over another.  
However, relying on a declaration of famine or pressure from the media before acting leads to 
unnecessary death and suffering. For famine to be declared, many people have already died and 
many others would be about to die. It is also inefficient in terms of resources. Once famine is 
declared, it takes time to mobilise resources and then implement humanitarian programs.19 It costs a 
lot more to feed people on the edge of starvation than it does to pre-empt it.20 There needs to be a 
solution to this challenge. It also needs to be a collective solution to ensure that donors like Australia 
invest in it.  
In hindsight it is clear that the critical issue in the worsening famine was the war and the sanctions 
strategies. International counterterrorism policies and Al-Shabaab restrictions and expulsions 
dramatically reduced humanitarian resources and reach. These sanctions, along with the remoteness 
of the operation in Somalia and its very high dependency on interpersonal trust, shaped a culture of 
uncertainty that seriously compromised the possibility of taking action in 2010 and early 2011.  
These limitations do not excuse the lack of early action, as the interagency evaluation makes clear.21 
However, it did mean that donors like Australia that did not have a long history in the region looked to 
donors that had been in the region longer and had greater resources to provide some of this analysis. 
The partial failure of the United Kingdom22 and the United States of America to act early, for instance, 
meant it was less likely that Australia, and donors like Australia, would act early.23  
The Australian aid program had an additional set of constraints as they were in the early stages of 
establishing a regional East Africa office. This meant that although they had an experienced and 
capable head of office, only about a quarter of the 20 or so staff they intended to recruit was in place. 
The Australian High Commission was also being expanded to accommodate the growth plan, meaning 
that the Australian aid program was in temporary accommodation, making official communication and 
access to corporate documentation difficult.  
Conclusions 
› Australia, like other donors, did not respond at scale in time for many of those who died during 
the famine. 
› The Australian aid program was constrained in its ability to respond due to limited information, 
being new to the region, and being in scale-up mode.  
› The Australian aid program recognised there was an impending crisis in Somalia early and 
secured some funding before famine was declared. 
                                                        
a  The September 2010 ‘special brief’ issue of the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit bulletin makes it abundantly 
clear there is a crisis in south-central Somalia. Subsequent issues document the worsening situation. 
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› In future responses to slow-onset crises, signals other than the declaration of famine need to be 
identified and prioritised to facilitate early action.  
3.3 Strategic approach 
The Australian aid program’s strategy for this crisis was never formally written down. The evolving 
nature of the funding envelope and the fast pace of events in the early days of the response made 
developing a strategy challenging. A formal written strategy would have helped the team better 
articulate their need for support. A clear strategy would also have helped to shift thinking from a 
reactive to a proactive mind-set—one that was trying to effect and monitor specific outcomes. 
Nevertheless, a number of sound key strategic decisions were made: 
› Geographic focus: A key decision was to focus funding on Somalia despite the risks and inherent 
difficulties. This was appropriate because the epicentre of the crisis, and therefore the needs for 
humanitarian assistance, were greatest there. In recognition of the massive displacement of 
people, funding was also provided to support Somali refugees in Kenya and in Ethiopia. The 
geographic areas where non-government organisations (NGOs) provided assistance were 
primarily determined by their existing operations and were not strongly influenced by the 
Australian aid program.  
› Sectoral focus: In funding UN agencies, a limited number of sectors—food assistance and support 
for displaced people—were prioritised. The intention behind these decisions was clear and 
appropriate: to provide the assistance needed most urgently to stop people dying. The Australian 
aid program had little influence on the sectors where NGOs provided assistance.  
› Partner focus: The overall strategy was to limit funding to a small number of agencies, including 
some that had already navigated access constraints. A key decision was to focus funding on UN 
agencies with most funding going to the World Food Programme (WFP) (see Section 4.6). In 
hindsight, it may have been better to allocate proportionally more funding to UN agencies and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which were already fully operational and able to 
access critical areas in Somalia. More funding should have been directed to partners that were 
using, or were willing to increase their use of, cash transfers.  
› Flexible funding: The Australian aid program worked with partners to identify broad objectives, but 
gave them the flexibility to decide what they funded within sectors and modalities. Ensuring 
flexibility for partners in a complex changing environment with lots of donor demands was an 
important well-founded decision. This was also done to recognise that the aid program had 
limited capacity to determine the most appropriate earmarking and that this was best done by 
implementing partners.  
› Management: Nairobi Post worked to make the overall system deliver results, which was a 
relevant and appropriate strategy. It saw them looking at the big picture rather than trying to 
micromanage every grant. Realistically, it was also the only strategy available given the human 
resource levels. 
The strategy was carried out in three main ways in Somalia. The Australian aid program closely 
supported the Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA, promoted and led donor coordination, and 
engaged robustly with WFP to ensure it delivered where they were operational. 
Management of assistance in Ethiopia and Kenya was more hands off. The light touch in Ethiopia and 
Kenya raises the question as to whether Australia should have responded at all in these countries, 
especially Ethiopia. Ethiopia certainly deserved assistance—the need was real and the response well 
executed (in the main)—but the Australian aid program was already stretched managing its response 
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in Somalia. In the future, it may be sensible to focus more geographically, with a potentially clearer 
impact. 
Conclusions 
› There was no formal written strategy to guide the response or articulate priorities. 
› The strategic decision to focus the bulk of funding on food assistance and Somalia was 
appropriate given the famine was most acute in Somalia. 
› Supporting the refugee response, providing flexible funding and investing effort in making the 
response work overall were appropriate strategic decisions. 
› In hindsight, proportionally more funding should have been directed to agencies with access to 
worst-affected areas and agencies that used cash transfers as a form of assistance. 
 
 
Internally displaced peopled in the Sigale Camp, Mogadishu, Somalia. Photo: Graham Mathieson, 
Save the Children 
3.4 Funding by partner 
In 2011, the bulk of Australian assistance, about 80 per cent, went to UN agencies with a heavy focus 
on WFP (Figure 3, Table 5). The focus on WFP indicates that the Australian Government prioritised 
strong returns in the reduction of malnutrition and the eradication of famine. Further support for food 
security came from allocations to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and to FAO. The 
prioritisation of refugee support was evidenced by the allocations to the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The UN Department for Safety and Security was also funded.  
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Figure 3 Australian financial assistance by type of agency 
 
ICRC = International Committee of the Red Cross; NGO = non-government organisation; UN = United Nations 
Note: NGO funding includes all funding allocated through the Dollar for Dollar Initiative as well as through other means. Some of 
the organisations funded through the Dollar for Dollar Initiative directed funding to UN agencies. Some of the funding 
provided to UN agencies was used to support other organisations. 
Funding was also given to the United Nations Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)—a pool of 
emergency funding administered by OCHA. In Somalia, the CHF funded international and local 
(Somali) NGOs, which provided the majority of the implementing capacity. This was one of the few 
sources of funding for Somali NGOs beyond partnering with UN agencies or international NGOs.  
The ICRC was allocated about 5 per cent of the total budget. This funding rightly recognised ICRC’s 
frontline responsibility within the Red Cross/Crescent movement for delivering assistance in conflict-
affected areas.  
Most of the remaining funding (about 15 per cent) was allocated to NGOs and the Australian Red 
Cross Society through two separate mechanisms: the Humanitarian Partnership Agreement (HPA) and 
the Dollar for Dollar Initiative (Table 5). In this diversification, Australia sought added value beyond UN 
programming. These investments also demonstrate a long-term interest in sustaining the reach and 
credibility of Australian NGOs. 
The HPA is an agreement between the Australian aid program and a preselected group of six 
Australian NGOs with significant global reach and capacity. The Dollar for Dollar Initiative was 
developed through discussions between Australian NGOs and the Australian aid program. In this 
initiative, the Australian Government matched the funds donated by the public to 19 NGOs and the 
Australian Red Cross Society over a specified period. The initiative aimed to raise funds for the crisis 
and to build public support. 
Conclusions 
› Australian funding was heavily focused on UN agencies (about 80 per cent), particularly WFP, 
which received about half the total funds. Other UN agencies funded included CHF, FAO, UNICEF 
and UNHCR. 
› Funds were also allocated to ICRC (5 per cent) and NGOs (15 per cent).  
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Table 5 Financial allocations to partners, 2011 
Agency HPA funding ($) Dollar for Dollar 
Initiative funding ($) 
Total ($) 
UN World Food Programme   57 000 000 
UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)   15 000 000 
UN Common Humanitarian Fund   3 000 000 
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)   10 000 000 
UN Food and Agriculture Organization   2 000 000 
International Committee of the Red Cross   5 000 000 
Australian Red Cross Society  636 624  636 624 
Save the Children Australia 1 500 000 1 500 859 4 163 859 
World Vision Australia 455 000 1 715 338 2 170 338 
Oxfam Australia 800 000 1 143 770 1 943 770 
Caritas Australia 455 000 1 386 107 1 841 107 
CARE Australia 990 000 487 915 1 477 915 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency  1 130 984 1 130 984 
PLAN Australia 800 000 258 750 1 058 750 
Australian Committee for UNICEF  1 046 872 1 046 872 
UN Department for Safety and Security    500 000 
Australian Lutheran World Service   810 875  810 875 
Australia for UNHCR   704 248  704 248 
Tear Australia   670 551  670 551 
Archbishop of Sydney’s Overseas Relief and Aid 
Fund 
  520 341  520 341 
ChildFund Australia   417 490  417 490 
CBM Australia  353 989 353 989 
National Council of Churches Australia Ltd  229 090 229 090 
Baptist World Aid Australia  222 539 222 539 
Uniting Church Overseas Aid (Uniting World)  171 333 171 333 
Anglican Board of Mission Australia  91 333 91 333 
Anglicord  84 183 84 183 
Total 5 000 000 13 583 191 112 246 191 
HPA = Humanitarian Partnership Agreement; UN = United Nations 
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3.5  Timeliness of funding for United Nations agencies and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross  
Following the declaration of famine, Australia was one of the first donors to commit funding. A series 
of announcements of funding packages were made: 
› $8 million on 13 July 2011: this includes grants made before the declaration (Table 4) and an 
additional $2 million for FAO 
› $25 million on 20 July 2011 (coinciding with the famine declaration): $15 million for the UN High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) regionally, $10 million for WFP Ethiopia 
› $42 million on 25 July 2011 (coinciding with the Foreign Minister’s trip to Somalia): for WFP with 
$33 million for Somalia and $9 million for Kenya (with $22 million of this coming from an annual 
contribution to WFP centrally, which was allocated by WFP themselves) 
› $15.5 million in August and September 2011: $10 million for the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
$5 million for the ICRC and $0.5 million for the UN Department for Safety and Security. 
This timing was similar to other, much bigger donors in the region such as the United Kingdom.24  
Several agencies interviewed stated that Australia was among the fastest to pay, with funds arriving 
within two weeks of pledges being made.25 This is faster than the European Community Humanitarian 
Office and CHF, which took 92 and 107 days, respectively, on average to disburse their allocations.26 
Conclusions 
› After the declaration of famine, Australia responded quickly and was among the first donors to 
commit significant levels of funding. 
› Once funds were committed, Australia disbursed funding quickly. 
3.6 Timeliness of funding for non-government organisations  
Funds were allocated to Australian NGOs through the HPA and Dollar for Dollar Initiative. The HPA was 
designed as a mechanism to facilitate speedy disbursal of funds in response to rapid-onset crises. 
When a disaster strikes, an envelope of funding is allocated, and the NGOs included in the agreement 
rapidly meet, decide who is best placed to respond and submit a proposal. The agreement specifies 
that funds are to be approved within 48–72 hours and released within seven days. At the time of the 
HoA crisis, the HPA had only recently been established. The first activation of the HPA was an 
allocation of $5 million to the HoA crisis on 20 July. This allocation was split between the agencies 
according to internal agreement.  
The Dollar for Dollar Initiative began in November 2011 and raised $13.5 million from the public, 
which was matched by the same amount by the Australian Government. Funds from this initiative 
went to HPA agencies and many other NGOs. The timing of the appeal meant that much of the 
funding went to ‘early recovery’ work. 
Conclusions 
› Funding of NGOs through the HPA was efficient and timely. 
› Funding from the Dollar for Dollar Initiative was not available to NGOs until many months after the 
declaration of famine.  
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3.7 Country allocations  
Somalia received the bulk of Australian assistance. Of total Australian support for the crisis, some 
$61 million went to Somalia, with lesser amounts of $14 million going to Ethiopia and $37 million to 
Kenya including the $15 million regional refugee contribution provided to UNHCR (as it all went to 
Dadaab). Funding to UN agencies followed this pattern (Figure 4). All funding to ICRC was used for 
Somalia. In contrast, proportionally more funding to NGOs was used in in both Kenya and Ethiopia. 
Conclusions 
› Australian assistance and allocations to UN agencies were appropriately concentrated on 
Somalia.  
› Funding to NGOs was used in all three countries. 
Figure 4 Australian financial assistance, by type of agency and country  
 
ICRC= International Red Crescent Society; NGO = non-government organisation; UN = United Nations 
3.8 Funding by sector and form of assistance 
Australian assistance was focused on food and nutrition (60 per cent) and refugee support 
(12 per cent) as intended, but funding also went to many other sectors (Figure 5). Other sectors that 
were well funded included livelihoods, and water, sanitation and hygiene. Smaller amounts of funding 
were used for education, health, shelter and non-food items, and protection.  
The sectors and type of assistance funded by UN and ICRC investments follow this general pattern, 
while NGO support was somewhat different (Figure 5). Proportionately, significantly less NGO funding 
was used for food (12 per cent) and displaced people, and much more for water, sanitation and 
hygiene (33 per cent), and livelihoods (24 per cent). Many of the sectors, including health and 
education, which received a low level of support from UN agencies, received proportionately more 
funding from NGOs funded by the Dollar for Dollar Initiative. Consequently, the sectoral spread of 
Australian assistance stems from NGO funding. 
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While Australia funded some cash transfer programs, they were only about 2 per cent of the overall 
budget. These were funded through grants to UNICEF, the OCHA-managed CHF, the HPA and later 
through the Dollar for Dollar Initiative. In comparison with UN agencies, NGOs allocated proportionally 
more funding to cash transfers. Notably, about 13 per cent of the HPA allocation was used for cash 
transfers. 
Conclusions 
› Australian assistance and allocations to UN agencies and ICRC were mostly focused on food and 
nutrition, and refugees, with less funding allocated to other sectors. 
› Most funding allocated to NGOs were allocated to water, sanitation and hygiene, and livelihoods. 
› Funding to NGOs increased the spread of funds across sectors. 
› Only a small proportion of funding was used for cash transfers. 
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Figure 5   Funding allocations to sectors and forms of assistance 
 
NFI = non-food items; WASH = water, sanitation and hygiene 
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4 Delivery of Australian assistance 
Key questions 
 
› Were there any areas in which Australia showed leadership?  
› To what extent did the Australian aid program influence partner and donor responses to the 
crisis? 
› How was Australian assistance coordinated with the international effort? 
› Were the mechanisms used to fund implementing partners efficient? 
› How did corporate systems perform?  
› What elements and channels of programming were most effective? 
4.1 Leadership and advocacy 
The most significant influencing work that Australia was involved in during the Horn of Africa (HoA) 
response was its political advocacy with other donors and its push to change their cautious approach. 
Australia’s foreign minister visited Somalia with the executive director of the United Nations (UN) 
World Food Programme (WFP) in late July, to publicise the urgency and severity of the crisis. This 
marked a moment of genuine international leadership by Australia. Not only did Australia call for 
others to fund generously and take greater risks in Somalia, it led by example—releasing funds early 
and focusing assistance on Somalia. Following this and other appeals (together with key allies such 
as the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for International Development), donor ‘caution’ was 
relaxed and more aid flowed into famine-stricken areas.  
During the crisis, the Australian aid program in Nairobi worked with UN agencies and other donors to 
have influence in the areas that affected how the ‘system’ could work most effectively. Stakeholder 
interviews showed clearly that Australian leadership in this area was appreciated.a Australia leveraged 
its investment in WFP, making it move faster than it might have done otherwise. A useful partnership 
formed between the Post and colleagues in the Rome office whereby a rapid exchange of information 
allowed for sensible advocacy to help WFP improve its response (for instance, making sure the 
deployment of emergency staff was speeded up). Australia also pushed WFP and the food cluster for 
better reporting that gave actual rather than planned beneficiary numbers. Such advocacy work is 
often essential in emergency response to ensure the largest multilateral agencies are performing. The 
Australian aid program needs to ensure that staffing levels and expertise are sufficient to facilitate 
such work.  
                                                        
a  Several donor agencies interviewed referred to Australian leadership on donor coordination; the United Nations was 
appreciative of the critical but constructive engagement. 
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Conclusions 
› Australia advocated for action and led by example through releasing funding early and taking 
some bold decisions.  
› Active engagement with multilateral agencies by donors is essential to guarantee performance. 
4.2 Coordination 
Coordination of the international response was viewed as poor in the HoA crisis, possibly because to 
work in Somalia, individual agencies needed to negotiate with Al-Shabaab and could not share 
sensitive information.27 Coordination ‘hubs’ established inside Somalia suffered staffing problems 
and found they could not easily organise meetings because security issues made it difficult for people 
to attend. The real-time evaluation from the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) found that 
there was a lack of strategic leadership from the key coordinating bodies, which resulted in no overall 
response strategy.28 The IASC evaluation saw coordination as mostly occurring through the cluster 
systemb centred in Nairobi. This produced multiple substrategies at the individual cluster level. The 
cluster system had limited non-government organisation (NGO) participation, prompting one NGO 
consulted in this evaluation to say ‘clusters have been a disaster here and should be scrapped’.29 
Parallel meetings were set up adjacent to the cluster system resulting in an overall crowding of the 
system.30 Other factors contributing to dysfunctional coordination were the access constraints in 
Somalia and the consequent relocation of the majority of the response management to Nairobi, about 
a thousand kilometres away from the famine epicentre. The breakdown of coordinated action meant 
that there was not a common operational picture of needs or who was doing what.  
In Nairobi, the Australian aid program took the view that coordination was critical, and looked to 
support the UN Humanitarian Coordinator’s efforts to direct the overall operation.c They tried to 
ensure Australia’s partners, such as WFP, engaged properly in coordination activities, as well as 
pressing other donors to do so. A good example of the former was the Australian aid program lobbying 
WFP to make the food cluster active and effective. In terms of donor coordination, Australia took on 
the leadership of the informal donor coordination group in early 2012. Implementing partners and 
other donors considered that Australia had effectively improved coordination and played a valuable 
‘brokering role’ between large donors, the UN system and smaller donors.  
Conclusions   
› In a complex conflict-affected environment, coordination is difficult. Despite this, the Australian 
aid program achieved some success in improving coordination and played a lead role in the 
coordination of food security among donors. 
4.3 Staffing levels and support 
The Australian response was characterised by the incredible dedication of aid program staff. The 
Africa program was tiny but growing fast when the crisis hit. In Nairobi, most staff members were new. 
                                                        
b  The ‘cluster’ system essentially arranges coordination by technical groups with a designated United Nations (UN) agency 
in charge. So the World Food Programme coordinates food, United Nations Children's Fund water, World Health 
Organization health and so on. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the humanitarian 
coordinator are responsible for bringing these various groupings together to provide overall coordination. 
c  The humanitarian coordinator is the most senior UN official in charge of the response on the ground. UN OCHA supports 
this position by providing a coordinating office. 
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In Canberra, staff already had a large and challenging portfolio. In these circumstances, Australia’s 
fast, effective and well-regarded response is a testament to the hard work of those involved. 
High volumes of aid handled by a small and relatively new team inevitably created challenges. There 
was little institutional experience in African famine and drought to call on. Neither was there a system 
in place to deploy extra support—especially humanitarian expertise—for complex conflict-related slow-
onset crises. This affected the team’s ability to monitor programs, adapt interventions and focus the 
portfolio. This is a key lesson for the Australian aid program.  
This evaluation found that the staffing levels deployed to support the response were inadequate. 
Staffing levels were not appropriately increased in Canberra or in Nairobi, despite a huge increase in 
workloads. Comparative staffing numbers for other humanitarian responses can be seen in Table 6. 
Table 6 Staffing levels for major Australian humanitarian operations 




Funding $112 million ( in 2011) $75 million $9 million  
Number of grants 44 29 3 
Staff at Post  4 11 10 
Dedicated staff at Post none 2–4 5  
Additional staff at desk 2  none 1 full time (1 week), 3 part 
time (1 week) 
Crisis centre Not activated 
 
Activated: 20 staff initially, 
but then 4–5 at any one 
time for 6 weeks  
Activated: up to 10 staff 
initially, but then 3–4 
officers at any one time for 
4 weeks  
RRT officers 2 1 to assist in overall 
response 
3 
Other support HER support for HPA and 
Dollar for Dollar Initiative 
4 taskforce officers 
(4 weeks) 
5 HER staff full time 
(1 week) 
HER = Humanitarian Emergency Response Section; HoA = Horn of Africa; RRT = rapid response team 
Despite the financial commitment to the HoA crisis being much greater than responses to the 
Pakistan flood in 2010 and to Cyclone Evan in Samoa, the HoA received the smallest amount of staff 
support (Table 6). Understaffing appears to be partly due to the designation of the crisis as ‘slow 
onset’ and therefore managed by the geographical desk. The Australian aid program has developed a 
well-functioning system, with a number of key tools for emergency responses to rapid-onset crises. 
Once an emergency is declared, a ‘crisis room’ system operates by putting a new team in place to 
manage it day to day, under the supervision of the Humanitarian Emergency Response Section. This 
can call on the rapid response team (RRT)—a group of staff across the organisation trained in 
emergency response and support roles. In the HoA crisis, the crisis centre was not activated and only 
two RRT members were deployed. Support from the Humanitarian Emergency Response Section was 
limited to use of the HPA mechanism, and the designing and running of the Dollar for Dollar Initiative. 
The fact that money was being exclusively channelled to partner agencies seems to have been 
another reason why staffing levels were not increased. Some staff who worked on the response 
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expressed the view that another factor may have been that staff with the required humanitarian 
expertise were not available within the wider organisation. 
This evaluation has identified a number of issues that are broadly applicable in responses to slow-
onset crises. 
› Partner-mediated responses require additional human resources: The assumption that because 
there is no direct response the workload is less is not the case. In fact, the oversight required of 
partners can be just as time consuming and the briefing, high-profile visits, policy work, and 
responses to public and political interest remain the same for both types of emergencies. 
› Some of the skill sets needed for complex humanitarian emergencies are different to those for 
‘natural’ disasters: Complex humanitarian emergencies often demand deep knowledge of how to 
work in conflict, and the international architecture deployed in such situations. There is a need for 
more generic ‘humanitarian adviser’ personnel, who are familiar with the architecture of the 
humanitarian system and the niche of the different responding agencies. These skills are 
important for help in strategy setting and for steering the response once resources have been 
committed. 
› The deployment times are longer in slow-onset crises: Typically, there is a need for heightened 
staffing levels for at least six months, meaning RRT deployments might be less useful for this type 
of scale-up as the removal of staff from their day jobs for this long is disruptive. The organisation 
may need to expand its cadre of humanitarian staff (who will be available for response in their 
regions, as well as deployable). Moreover, ways to scale up staffing rapidly, including through 
consultancy type arrangements, need to be found. 
› The intense period for the first six weeks is very similar to rapid onset: In this period, the types of 
skills the RRT has to offer are as useful as in rapid-onset contexts—briefing, disbursal, strategy 
setting, contracting and so on. 
› The management should stay with the desk, but the largest responses should have corporate 
oversight: There is a need to recognise that in the largest emergencies there should be a 
‘corporate response’—some sort of trigger that means senior management endorse the correct 
resources and tap into the skills of the humanitarian branch properly. A simple activation 
procedure—such as a meeting with some standard agenda items—would suffice. 
› Working on humanitarian crises stresses staff through both workloads and exposure to traumatic 
suffering: The Australian aid program should recognise this as a matter of policy and make sure 
procedures are in place to support staff properly. 
Conclusions 
› There were few, if any, extra staff deployed to help with the HoA response, either in Canberra or in 
Nairobi, despite it being the largest ever response by the program in financial volume. Heavy 
workloads, as well as witnessing the devastating effects of the famine, led to extremely high 
pressure and stress on staff. 
› The fact it was a slow-onset crisis meant that rapid-onset models did not apply. In the future, a 
system needs to be put in place to resource such responses rapidly and properly. 
4.4 Flexibility of funding  
Australia worked with partners to identify broad goals but gave partners scope to adapt programs to 
specific or evolving circumstances. Interviews found that Australia’s flexibility as a donor was 
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appreciated. Flexible funding is important, as it allows those closest to the work to make decisions on 
where the greatest need lies and how needs can be addressed most effectively.  
Conclusion 
› Australia was noted for being a flexible donor and should continue to provide flexible funding to 
partners. 
4.5 Monitoring partner performance  
This evaluation found a lack of capacity within the aid program during the HoA response to monitor 
the performance of partners. The lack of capacity was compounded by the difficulty of obtaining good 
data in a conflict zone and the general lack of transparency within the sector. As a result of limited 
staffing, resources were quite sensibly focused on monitoring the largest grants, and in particular on 
WFP. The effective work that the Australian aid program did in pushing WFP for greater transparency 
(about lack of access), and pushing for coordination mechanisms such as the food security cluster to 
be established, shows how donors are often obliged to ‘actively manage’ their funding portfolios. The 
greater the financial commitment and the more complex the situation, the more active management 
is needed. A conclusion of this evaluation is that during crises Australia needs to deploy routinely 
more capacity to engage with partners and monitor their operations.  
The level of detail of information needed to evaluate retrospectively the performance of implementing 
partners is not available. Agencies, particularly UN agencies, did not report in any detail on what was 
achieved as a result of flexible funding. Nairobi Post accepted that there was a direct trade-off 
between flexibility and reporting on Australia-specific results. As a result, by the end of the crisis, 
knowledge of the impact of Australian funding was limited.  
An illustrative example of this issue is provided by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
who were given $15 million for a ‘regional refugee response’. UNHCR did not report on this 
expenditure beyond its standard reporting (annual country reports, global reports), as is the 
agreement. When more information was requested for this evaluation, the agency confirmed that all 
of the funds had been allocated to the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, but what the funds had been 
spent on could not be identified. The evaluators were told that if Australia had specified in advance 
where funding should be spent a detailed expenditure report would have been provided, but because 
funding was given flexibly funds had not been tracked. 
Beyond standard reporting, little additional information about what was delivered and what was 
achieved was available to this evaluation or forthcoming on request. Some UN agencies stated that 
requests for information were not met as they created extra work and were not in the original 
agreement. NGOs routinely provide more information about their work, both ahead of time and 
retrospectively, than the UN agencies. Asking UN agencies to provide this level of information would 
help Australia to better understand who is routinely performing. 
Flexible funding need not require a trade-off with reporting. Based on the HoA experience, there are 
some key principles that will help Australia’s aid be flexible without reducing the usefulness of 
reporting: 
› Agencies do not need to be overly prescriptive at the proposal stage. Proposals can be solicited 
on the basis of broad strategic fit, with a commitment to achieve high-level outcomes. 
› Reporting needs can be specified in some detail in agency level granting agreements. All agencies 
have detailed internal accounting systems; donor funds are allocated codes and reports can be 
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generated against this to show precise expenditure on all lines. This type of financial accounting 
should be required as routine. 
› Australian aid can specify reporting on outputs or outcomes in its agreements. Reporting 
requirements can be based on what is practical and how the information will be used. 
Standards and policies requiring sex disaggregation of beneficiary numbers also continue to be 
ignored or deemed infeasible by many agencies. While this is usually done at project level, numbers 
are then aggregated for higher-level reporting. This precludes monitoring and reporting on the most 
basic level of equity, comparing the value of relief items distributed to men and boys with the value of 
relief items distributed to women and girls. 
As the humanitarian work of the Australian aid program has grown in complexity, scale and ambition, 
the organisation has begun to build humanitarian expertise. Recently, a humanitarian adviser has 
been appointed in Canberra and there are also a growing, but still insufficient, number of 
humanitarian professionals in Posts. A mechanism to redeploy these types of advisers rapidly, or to 
be able to bring in others at short notice, would give the organisation access to robust monitoring 
capacity, in turn allowing for better informed decision-making and follow-up. 
Conclusions 
› Efforts to monitor partner performance during the crisis focused largely on WFP. 
› An inadequate deployment of staff to work on the crisis meant that the Australian aid program 
was not able to monitor its portfolio in detail.  
› NGOs typically reported in more detail than UN agencies. 
› A number of UN agencies receiving significant levels of funding did not provide adequate 
information on outcomes, and did not disaggregate data by sex and age. 
› Flexibility has become conflated with a lack of scrutiny, but this should not be the case. Future 
agreements with UN agencies should continue to provide funds flexibly but also require greater 
specificity in reporting and accountability. 
4.6 Choice of implementing partners 
The Australian aid program’s strategic intent was sound but the operational reality in the HoA 
complicated humanitarian responses. Al-Shabaab controlled the worst-affected areas, where they 
banned many aid groups and made delivery dangerous and difficult for the rest. The complex 
contextual constraints and lack of detailed reporting by some partners make it difficult to evaluate the 
choices about implementing partners.  
Largely, Australia made good choices about which partners to fund. The level of WFP funding and the 
small numbers partners who used of cash-transfer programming (see Box 1) are the exceptions. The 
following covers the main funding decisions. 
World Food Programme 
The background to the decision to focus funding heavily on WFP is worth setting out to understand 
the constraints and opportunities that existed at the time.  
At the time of the famine declaration, the international aid community was trying to find ways to get a 
general distribution of food going. Widespread free food distribution is an obvious thing to do in 
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famine. Increasing the general availability of food is also beneficial as it helps ensure that the special 
nutritional foods are used to treat clinically malnourished children as intended, as well as reducing 
the need to sell assets for food. WFP is the pre-eminent deliverer of emergency food globally. It is 
consistently rated as one of the best-performing humanitarian agencies, with a reputation for fast 
response and slick logistics. They scored highly in Australia’s Assessment of multilateral agencies and 
in the United Kingdom equivalent, the Multilateral assessment review. WFP is one of the few agencies 
that can deliver food to millions of people rather than hundreds or thousands. 
However, in July 2011, the capacity of WFP to instigate large-scale food distribution in the worst-
affected areas of Somalia was limited. In the years leading up to the crisis, the combination of a UN 
monitoring report criticising WFP for inadequate scrutiny of Somali contractors31 and unacceptable 
operating restrictions enforced by Al-Shabaab meant WFP ceased operations in south-central 
Somalia. Many donors suspended financial support for WFP. An additional problem faced by WFP was 
being banned by Al-Shabaab in January 2010.32 As a result, when the crisis escalated, WFP had no 
access to Al-Shabaab–controlled areas and had not received substantial funding, meaning it had few 
resources should it gain access.33 
Although WFP was not operational in the most severely affected regions,34 other agencies were not 
able to fill the gap because contingency plans for the absence of WFP had not been developed. 
Consequently, despite WFP’s lack of access and funding for almost a year, the agency was still both 
perceived and promoting itself as the agency to undertake large-scale food distribution in Somalia. It 
was hoped that Al-Shabaab, faced with a catastrophe in their area and a change in policy from WFP, 
would enable WFP to commence large-scale food distribution in the worst-affected areas. 
Al-Shabaab did not allow WFP access to south-central Somalia, preventing any impact it might have 
had in the epicentre of the famine at the peak of the crisis. WFP also took time to get going, starting 
from a very low base, having lost much of its capacity. It was September 2011 before WFP Somalia 
was able to adequately scale up operations, and even then only in the border areas and Mogadishu 
were there were large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs). As a result, only 24 per cent of 
funding of WFP in Somalia went to the south-central area (Figure 6). Consequently, by financing WFP 
in Somalia, Australia arguably did not fund the most immediate life-saving interventions. At the time, it 
was not possible to know that WFP would not have access, although it was possible to predict it would 
take time to scale-up.  
At scale, WFP distributed food across significant areas in Somalia, principally in Mogadishu, Puntland 
and the border areas, which received large numbers of IDPs. Most WFP assistance was provided 
outside the worst-affected region. Intrinsically, there is nothing wrong with this, especially if others are 
providing assistance in other regions—it can be seen as a division of labour. But it was not the 
Australian aid program’s original intention.  
Throughout the crisis, WFP continued to operate on a food-delivery model despite reforms in 
headquarters to increase the agency’s use of cash transfers. The use of a food-delivery model to 
some extent reflected the agency’s focus on IDPs in Somalia. However, this meant that the bulk of 
Australian assistance did not catch the wave of cash-based programming that that proved effective in 
famine areas. This significantly affected the efficacy of the Australian intervention in Somalia. 
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Figure 6 Regional breakdown of Australian financial assistance to Somalia through the World 
Food Programme 
 
The strong focus on WFP did, however, deliver good outcomes in both Kenya and Ethiopia. In Kenya, 
Australia also gave $8.6 million to WFP Kenya for the refugee-feeding operation. WFP used local 
implementing agencies to support a general food distribution and a supplementary feeding program. 
Given the huge influx of refugees to Kenya, the massive challenge this represented for the 
Government of Kenya, and the strong performance of WFP and UNHCRd in meeting these challenges, 
this seems like both a sensible investment and a well-founded priority. 
UN High Commission for Refugees  
Outside Somalia, the second-largest overall commitment was for refugees in Kenya, principally in the 
Dadaab camp. Once again, part of this prioritisation was intended, and part of it determined by the 
UNHCR. Australia donated $15 million to UNHCR for their regional refugee appeal, all of which was 
used in the Dadaab camps. As stated above, this funding was well justified and effectively used. 
UN Common Humanitarian Fund 
The UN Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) was very useful in the crisis, as it was only mechanism 
through which local (Somali) NGOs could be supported. Its decision-making process uses operational 
agencies to determine priorities, making it theoretically closer to the ground. It is also administratively 
straightforward, with opportunities for donors to engage at a strategic level in decision-making. 
However, the CHF process was slow throughout the period under examination. The ‘standard 
allocation’ took an average of three months to get money out to partners, and even the ‘emergency 
reserve’ (approximately 20 per cent of the CHF) took on average 11 weeks.35 Compared to Australia’s 
two-week delivery36 this is a critical flaw, especially in a famine where every day counts. The reason 
appears to have been administration based in Geneva (the CHF is run by the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], part of the UN Secretariat and therefore subject to their 
rules)—an issue that constantly impedes such mechanisms. 
                                                        
d  While there were undoubtedly many challenges, the mortality rate remained below emergency standards in the Dadaab 
camp despite refugees arriving in extremely poor condition. This suggests the aid operation was effective in meeting 
immediate needs. 
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UN Children’s Fund and UN Food and Agriculture Organization  
In Somalia, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) were widely 
perceived to be among the best-performing UN agencies. They both had access in Al-Shabaab areas, 
and significantly expanded their programs to attempt to cover the absence of WFP. UNICEF’s cash 
program, and its de facto lead in this sector, was excellent.37 FAO also supported affected 
communities with cash transfers and used innovative measures such as the approach to Dubai-based 
Somali food traders to increase their presence. Other forms of assistance were also exploited by both 
agencies: UNICEF undertook significant water and sanitation work, and was the lead UN agency for 
nutrition supplying Plumpy’Nut (a high-energy peanut-based food), and FAO worked to improve 
livelihoods.  
International Committee of the Red Cross  
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) appears to have performed particularly well. The 
free food distribution that took place in south-central Somalia was largely delivered by the ICRC, who 
distributed food to about a million people. This was possible because the ICRC: 
› was very experienced in working in south-central Somalia 
› managed to remain in critical regions for longer than most other international organisations, as it 
was not expelled by Al-Shabaab until January 2012 
› engaged Somali program staff, who then subcontracted local assistance.  
ICRC also supported the health clinics of the Somali Red Crescent Society (which enjoys a good 
reputation), as well as undertaking their traditional protection work.  
Retrospectively, ICRC should probably have received more funding as, at the time funding allocations 
were made, they had access to the most severely affected areas of Somalia and, in interviews, 
indicated they had some capacity to use additional funding. 
Overall partner choice 
In hindsight, while partner performance was clearly related to their capacity to work in country 
contexts, the choice of implementing partners was appropriate overall. The funding of multiple UN 
agencies helped to achieve the strategic intention to focus assistance on Somalia and address food 
and refugee needs. A good learning point for the Australian aid program is the need to ensure that 
decision-making should place greater weight on the informed analysis of those closest to the 
operation including Post, program areas and other donors with extensive regional experience. Such 
an approach would have resulted in more funding for the ICRC, UNICEF and FAO, and proportionately 
slightly less for WFP. 
Conclusions 
› Effectiveness of implementing partners was highly reliant on context. 
› WFP in Somalia took time to scale up and were constrained by access issues, which meant 
Australian funding did not immediately reach those most in need as intended. Later, once WFP 
became operational in Mogadishu and border regions, it did succeed in delivering food to famine 
victims. 
› Funding to WFP and UNHCR was used to provide much needed assistance to the refugees in 
Kenya, which was effective under the circumstances. 
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› The Red Cross Movement (and ICRC in particular) performed consistently highly. 
› Of the UN agencies, UNICEF and the FAO performed well in Somalia, and WFP and UNHCR in 
Kenya. The CHF provides an excellent mechanism on many levels—reach, analytical ability, 
coordination, local NGOs—but was severely constrained by slow disbursal. 
› Decision-making should place greater weight on informed analysis provided by those closest to 
operations.  
4.7 Appropriateness of NGO funding mechanisms  
In the HoA crisis, funding mechanisms determined which NGOs were funded. Funds were allocated to 
NGOs that were in the Humanitarian Partnership Agreement (HPA) or funded by the Australian public.  
Humanitarian Partnership Agreement  
The HPA was expedient rather than strategic in the HoA crisis. It disbursed funds quickly with minimal 
paperwork but with limited volumes in a protracted African crisis for which it was not specifically 
designed. All six HPA agencies had presence in the region and were able to prioritise effectively the 
funding among them to ensure funds went to the members best placed to respond. The consideration 
of proposals by the HPA NGO partners was based on OCHA assessments, in-country partners and 
public sources.38 Beyond this, there was no intention to coordinate and there was limited 
collaboration within the HPA. Oxfam championing the use of gender action plans is an example of the 
collaboration that did occur. 
The HPA partners conducted their own evaluation into the mechanism, finding that ‘projects generally 
met or exceeded the output targets in their implementation plans’ and ‘a number of examples of 
innovation and good practice can be found in project reporting’. Support provided to NGOs was used 
in Somalia but also Kenya and Ethiopia in the life-saving phase of the emergency immediately after 
the famine declaration.  
The NGOs in the HPA mechanism were probably among the Australian NGOs best placed to deliver 
assistance in the HoA. However, like WFP, at least two had been excluded from south-central Somalia 
by Al-Shabaab. Several other NGOs, which did not have an Australian base, were much better placed 
to deliver assistance in the worst-affected parts of Somalia—for example, Action Against Hunger and 
the Danish Refugee Council. This is not to deny the good work highlighted by the HPA’s evaluation, but 
only to suggest that a mechanism designed for rapid response in Asia and the Pacific could not be 
expected to have the same ‘fit’ when applied to a famine in an area of conflict in east Africa. 
The question of what might work better than the HPA is difficult to answer. One option is to let those 
closest to the crisis decide which agencies are best placed to respond to the most pressing need. 
However, this requires humanitarian liaison capacity and, potentially, means more administration 
(multiple grants), which could compromise speed. Working with locally based NGOs requires a 
mechanism to be in place to ensure due diligence. Other options include an adapted mechanism that 
allows for separate procedures for slow- and rapid-onset crises, or some way of assessing and funding 
potential new partners directly. 
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Australian assistance provided through the Humanitarian Partnership Agreement was used by CARE to 
provide water in Dadaab camp in northern Kenya. Photo: Kate Holt, CARE Australia. 
Dollar for Dollar Initiative 
Opinions are divided on the merit of the Dollar for Dollar Initiative. It was organised at short notice and 
therefore had to be designed in a hurry. It required a significant amount of work and time to formulate 
and negotiate parameters (which donations could be accepted) and resulted in funding going to an 
inordinately large number of NGOs. By the time funds were being disbursed, the peak of the famine 
was over. Some NGOs were still spending funds when this evaluation was conducted. Funds were 
largely spent on recovery activities or long-term development rather than emergency assistance.  
Like the HPA mechanism, the Dollar for Dollar Initiative was not necessarily the best way of 
channelling funds to organisations with operations in the heart of the famine zone. The majority of the 
Dollar for Dollar Initiative agencies, as with the HPA, acted as conduits for funding to sister agencies 
in the HoA, or into larger families of organisations. Where the funding went depended on where these 
organisations had presence. Much of the funding, for example, ended up in Kenya, because it had the 
greatest number of pre-existing agencies with links to Australian NGOs (usually engaged in long-term 
development work). These historical ties and agencies usually meant an intimate knowledge of the 
area, making for some excellent projects. In a small number of cases, however, it meant funds going 
to areas that were only marginally affected by the famine. One agency’s rehabilitation of a water 
system in coastal Kenya falls into this category. In the future, the effectiveness of such schemes 
could be increased by the aid program directing that funds must be channelled to priority needs. 
The large number of organisations funded through this initiative meant that it was administratively 
burdensome. A fundraising consortium or entity, able to receive and administer funds, could have 
streamlined the initiative. On the other hand, the Dollar for Dollar Initiative engaged the public and 
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was a major fundraising success.e The reporting forms and formats seemed widely appreciated by the 
agencies, suggesting that work done in the initial scheme could be used or modified for any 
subsequent effort. A public engagement and fundraising strategy needs careful thought, in 
collaboration with NGOs, ahead of the next large-scale emergency. 
What the Dollar for Dollar Initiative did offer, beyond public engagement and extra fundraising (two 
very big bonuses), was the opportunity to channel funds to NGOs that had no other opportunity to 
access Australian emergency aid. This is a serious consideration in the current funding architecture 
for emergency response, and one that needs to be looked at thoughtfully. There is no doubt that 
NGOs are one part of the large humanitarian architecture and they, like the other parts, need to 
function to contribute to an overall rapid and effective response. Learning from the HPA and Dollar for 
Dollar Initiative suggests the need for more such mechanisms, perhaps in conjunction with other 
donors, and perhaps on a regional- or crisis-specific basis.  
Conclusions 
› The HPA enabled a rapid disbursal of funds and the funded NGOs achieved some good results. 
However, the HPA was not designed for the HoA context and, as a result, had mixed coverage.  
› The Dollar for Dollar Initiative raised funds and engaged the Australian public, but it was 
administratively burdensome and did not provide funding until late in 2011. 
› Some NGO-funded programs delivered critical life-saving assistance. Other programs focused on 
the recovery phase and built resilience.  
4.8 Appropriateness of sectoral funding  
Although Australian funding was generally focused on key sectors, there was also considerable spread 
across all sectors, largely as a result of NGO funding. In particular, funding provided through the Dollar 
for Dollar Initiative was provided without direction and, as a result, was spread across all sectors. The 
severity of the crisis meant that people needed assistance in all sectors. 
The evidence from this evaluation suggests that a certain amount of focus is desirable. Funds 
dispersed too flexibly may not end up addressing the most urgent needs, and certainly may not flow to 
where Australia intends. Funds can be dispersed on the basis of addressing a particular sector or 
area, but it can be left up to the agencies on how exactly to address the problem. A strategy can 
outline broad focus—the sectors, places and people that are priorities—and the detail can be worked 
out collaboratively later. This is flexible, but also focused. 
Conclusion 
› The aid program probably should have directed agencies towards the sectors that Australia 
wanted to fund and in so doing reduced some of the sectoral spread. 
                                                        
e  A report produced by Media Monitors for AusAID found that, in the 71 days between 5 October 2011 and 14 December 
2011 (the period of the Dollar for Dollar Initiative), there were 137 separate media items. This coverage reached a 
cumulative audience of 9 062 444 people. 
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A water bladder provided by Save the Children in Darawish camp, Mogadishu. Photo: Graham 
Mathieson, Save the Children 
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4.9 Appropriateness of modes of assistance  
With WFP as its main partner, Australian assistance was focused on funding of food aid. A 2012 
evaluation of the WFP Somalia program for the past decade concluded that ‘there is a need to open 
up the debate on the relevance and impact of food aid, including its impact on vulnerable households, 
the dependency it generates and the degree to which it complements or undermines the 
agricultural/pastoral economy’.39 
In the famine epicentre, Al-Shabaab control made it very difficult, costly and dangerous to get food in. 
Some humanitarian agencies that were still able to work in these areas exploited a novel way of 
helping people that was already being piloted in Somalia—cash. Cash-based programming has been 
gaining credibility in humanitarian operations for a number of years (see Box 1). In Somalia, it was 
carried out on a massive scale in 2011–12, with more than US$100 million in cash handed out, 
coordinated by UNICEF.  
A recent evaluation of cash transfers, commissioned by UNICEF, concluded that, 
The unconditional cash and voucher response … quickly achieved an impressive scale, 
building principally on international and Somali NGO field capacity. The evidence 
marshalled in this evaluation suggests that cash and vouchers made a quantifiable 
difference in reducing hunger and improving food security, enabling a more rapid 
recovery than would have been possible without assistance.40  
The UNICEF evaluation also found that even in the worst-affected areas of Somalia, cash transfers 
attracted merchants and people were able to buy food. Another benefit of this modality was that there 
was little diversion or stealing. If anything, the diversion rates appear to have been lower than with 
food. On balance, cash transfers benefited women and men equally and put decision-making at family 
level.41 Interviews conducted with beneficiaries of Australian aid in Wajir, Kenya, similarly found that 
cash transfers had been a valuable form of assistance (Box 2). 
The fact that such a large-scale cash transfer program took place,f in such a complex and risky 
environment, and was apparently successful, should be a clear signal to the Australian aid program.  
Box 2 Beneficiaries views on cash transfers 
 
Most women targeted did not have enough change of clothes and were able to buy some for themselves 
through the cash relief. 
Woman beneficiary 
Coming from a culture where women are looked down upon, this (the cash relief) greatly boosted the 
morale of the women and gave them a sense of self-worth and dignity. 
Implementing agency staff  
The elderly beneficiaries, who were mostly women, were happy because they had the freedom to buy 
easily chewable food such as liver. 
Woman beneficiary 
Conclusion 
› Cash transfers were an extremely important substitute for food distributions that worked well but 
were not fully exploited.
                                                        
f  The UNICEF cash evaluation suggests that ‘the declaration of famine in July 2011 effectively created “consensus by 
compulsion in the face of famine” making significant funds available for a rapid cash-based response’.  
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5 Responding to needs 
Key questions 
 
› Did the response meet the needs of affected people?  
› How did Australia’s approach align with other policies and guidelines related to gender? 
› Did the response build on local capacities and government priorities where appropriate? 
› Were affected people involved in planning and implementing the response? 
› How was vulnerability, including gender issues, taken into account in targeting assistance?  
› Did the response address the protection needs of affected people?  
› How did Australia’s assistance support recovery and resilience building? 
5.1 Gender 
The use of participatory and inclusive approaches and practices in line with Australian aid’s 
Humanitarian Action Policy (2011) appeared to be standard among partner agencies and their 
implementing partners. As part of the evaluation, qualitative data on gender were collected for 
Australian-funded projects in northern Kenya (Wajir area).  
Interviews found that programs of World Food Programme (WFP), Save the Children and Oxfam paid 
attention to the balance of men and women on committees involved in beneficiary identification and 
verification. Typically, relief committees set up to target the most vulnerable were required to have at 
least 50 per cent women. Obtaining the views of men and women in separate discussion forums was 
consistently confirmed as a requirement at project level. Programming intentionally designed to target 
women was common. Both food distribution and cash transfer projects targeted women.  
About 80 per cent of the recipients of food distributed by WFP in Wajir were women. Women 
beneficiaries interviewed said that the food distributed helped them, because they did not have 
enough money to purchase food for their families. Beneficiaries also felt that their food management 
skills had improved through their work measuring food rations during the food collection and 
distribution process. 
Most of the beneficiaries of cash transfers provided by Oxfam in Wajir were women. Although some 
cash-transfer programs were available through mobile banks, cash was mostly delivered at cash-
collection points. Efforts were made to ensure collection points were close to the homes of 
beneficiaries so that women could easily and safely reach them (see Box 3). Women beneficiaries 
reported satisfaction with cash transfers, citing increased independence on a wide range of 
household expenditure decisions, expanded income generation options, ability to obtain credit and 
increased asset ownership in non-traditional areas (particularly livestock). Cash transfers were also 
valued because they allowed people to choose food items suitable for children and the elderly. 
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A few problems associated with cash transfers related to gender were identified. Some interviewees 
commented that the transfers changed fundamental gender relations. Some men were not happy that 
their wives were in control of the cash. Another issue was that the cash-collection process required 
identity cards, which many women did not have. A person or relative, typically a male, was required to 
sign on behalf of women without cards and often the signatory asked for a share of the cash.  
Gender issues were also found to have been specifically addressed in a water, sanitation and hygiene 
program in Wajir implemented by Oxfam (see Box 3). Separate latrines for boys and girls were built to 
promote privacy for the girls during their menstrual cycle. Previously, the girls had to go home at this 
time, sometimes missing school or even dropping out of school completely. Additional bathing areas 
were constructed for girls to use during their monthly menstrual periods, as water was scarce in their 
homes. Hygiene awareness campaigns were accompanied by the provision of sanitary towels.  
Box 3 Gender-sensitive programming  
 
Previously, boys would tease the girls, a form of gender-based violence, when they suspected that it was 
‘that time of the month’, causing girls to opt to abscond from school until their periods were over. 
Woman beneficiary 
Women increasingly raised voices about special needs such as sanitary materials, compared to the past 
when this was taboo. 
Save the Children staff 
The distances from the target beneficiary homes to cash collection points were short, and were planned in 
a manner that ensured safety for the household beneficiaries, who were mainly women. 
Implementing agency staff 
Partner commitment to including women in relief activities does not yet extend to analysing or 
addressing women’s pre-existing workloads and burdens. In organising themselves to take on the 
responsibilities of humanitarian projects in addition to their everyday household tasks, beneficiary 
women described a range of negative coping methods including increased work for girls and elderly 
women, or extended workdays for themselves.  
Reporting is an area where more needs to be done in terms of gender. While beneficiary data were 
routinely sex disaggregated at project level, most agencies subsequently aggregated this information 
at higher levels, precluding any gender analysis. Non-government organisation (NGO) partners noted 
that the Australian project proposal template requiring disaggregation by age, gender and disability 
was an effective planning tool but, unfortunately, the same attention was not given to disaggregation 
of results. Australian aid policy has recognised that such reporting is essential in planning and 
understanding the impacts of humanitarian assistance. The 2013–14 priority commitments of 
Australian aid’s 2011 Humanitarian Action Policy implementation plan (2012) are therefore 
extremely timely. The plan commits to collect data from implementing partners that articulates how 
assistance is provided by sex and age.  
Conclusions 
› Appropriate consideration of gender appeared to be standard among partner agencies and their 
implementing partners. 
› Australia’s partners employed gender-equity practices, particularly by targeting women for food 
vouchers and cash transfers.  
› There were inadequate strategies for monitoring outcomes in terms of gender, nor is beneficiary 
disaggregated data used analytically.  
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5.2 Local capacities and priorities 
Understanding the local context is required for effective humanitarian assistance. Local organisations 
played important roles in the delivery of assistance in all three countries. Australia’s contributions to 
WFP in Ethiopia and the Hunger Safety Net Programmea in Kenya both supported local capacities. In 
some programs, implementing partners built on local capacities and priorities by working through 
agencies that were either local or had an established presence in the local area. For example, in Wajir 
in northern Kenya, WFP worked with Arid Lands Development Focus, Wajir South Development 
Association, Islamic Relief Kenya and Save the Children. In Somalia, remote management 
necessitated delegation to local partners and local teams. Consequently, Somali NGOs became the 
main aid-delivery mechanism and were probably significantly empowered as a result. Working with 
local organisations would have helped align Australian assistance with local priorities and may have 
played a significant part in building local capacities.  
Conclusion 
› Australian assistance probably supported and built local capacity. 
 
Red Cross worked closely with communities in Ethiopia and other countries across central Africa to support 
them with long-term access to water and sanitation facilities during the drought. Photo: Jose Cendon, 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
                                                        
a  The Hunger Safety Net Program is a social safety net, implemented by the Kenyan Government in the northern arid 
areas. It is funded by the United Kingdom, Australia and other international donors. 
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5.3 Beneficiary participation  
Beneficiary participation was not a requirement of Australian funding, nor was it reported on.b It is 
difficult to make an assessment of the degree of beneficiary participation, as programs were diverse 
and, in the south-central region of Somalia, work was done remotely with little monitoring or 
independent scrutiny. Also, the degree to which beneficiary participation is essential arguably 
depends on the type of assistance. The requirement for participation is less in emergency nutrition 
and medical care when the imperative is saving lives. 
While there is a lack of strong evidence to determine whether beneficiaries were appropriately 
involved by agencies funded by Australia, circumstantial evidence and standard practice suggests 
that participation was probably patchy. The Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP) undertook an 
interagency accountability and quality-mapping exercise, focusing primarily on northern Kenya.42 All of 
the NGOs funded under the Humanitarian Partnership Agreement or their parent bodies, as well as 
some other implementing partners, are members of HAP. HAP found that ‘community members 
highlighted the lack of clear community consultation and involvement in project proposal, planning, 
design, implementation and monitoring’.  
This evaluation interviewed a small number of beneficiaries and local implementing partners of 
funded agencies in Wajir, northern Kenya. Findings from these interviews were different from those of 
the HAP. These interviews found that beneficiary participation had been facilitated in a number of 
ways (see Box 4). Communities may not have been involved in all stages of planning and 
implementation, but the majority of agencies engaged in ‘partial participation’—participation in one or 
more phases of the project cycle. The agencies funded by Australia engaged implementing partners 
that had a strong local profile. These partners recruited and used local expertise, providing an 
appropriate understanding of the context and cultural values, and building a sense of ownership. 
Local implementing staff for both WFP and Oxfam in Wajir consulted communities in the targeting 
process and implementation. The implementing agencies reached out to the local community through 
community leaders to establish relief committees. The most vulnerable members of communities 
were targeted in a consultative process involving relief committees, government-led district steering 
groups and various local-level working groups. The accuracy of targeting was validated through 
various means, including a public ‘baraza’ (meeting) organised by local leaders, forums (including 
some only for women) and a door-to-door verification process. Beneficiaries were also involved in 
distribution processes, teaching their acquired skills to others, handling complaints and providing 
feedback. 
Conclusion 
› The degree of beneficiary participation was probably variable. Examples of good practice in the 
implementation of assistance programs were recorded.  
  
                                                        
b  There were no directives to partners with regard to participation—it was not a condition of funding nor did it appear in any 
of the documentation. 
53 
Box 4 Beneficiary participation  
 
Local involvement was a key factor in achieving inclusive participation of women, men, boys and girls 
throughout the project cycles, strengthening community ownership and sustainability of initiatives 
after the emergency response. 
Implementing agency staff 
Investing in community complaints mechanisms, post-project community feedback and review meetings, 
and enhancement of accountability to beneficiaries created space for women to articulate their 
needs, changes in their status and also in gender relations. 
Implementing agency staff 
 
 
Local people were given opportunities to work on projects to improve water and sanitation facilities in their 
communities during and after the drought crisis. Photo: Simone Novotny, International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies. 
5.4 Addressing vulnerabilities  
As with participation, the evidence as to whether vulnerability was specifically addressed is patchy. 
Lack of access, poor data and partial analysis all meant that while there were examples of good 
practice, overall the picture was less clear. 
Documentation and interviews indicated that vulnerabilities were generally included in program 
design by Australia’s implementing partners. The majority of agencies used some form of community-
based targeting. For example, as previously described, Australian-funded WFP and Oxfam projects in 
Wajir used a consultative process to assess needs so that those most vulnerable could be specifically 
targeted. This enabled priority to be given to female-headed households, the elderly, people with 
disabilities and orphaned children. The criteria and the formula for targeting varied from agency to 
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agency, and the evaluation’s scope did not reach to analyse each one. Nor is there independent or 
academically rigorous analysis of what this meant for extremely vulnerable families or individuals in 
practice. 
There is now emerging evidence that clan dynamics and marginalisation played a larger role in the 
famine than was understood at the time. A special issue of the Global Food Security journal in 2012 
suggested the Reewin and Bantu groups had been the hardest hit, as they had during the 1991–92 
famine.43 Future responses should ensure that, where possible, humanitarian assistance is 
responsive to the needs of groups with a history of marginalisation.  
Conclusions 
› Implementing partners made an effort to target vulnerable groups.  
› The needs of some marginalised groups appear to have been overlooked. 
5.5 Protection 
Protection needs were high in Somalia and across the region as large groups of people, 
predominantly women and children, travelled long distances in an attempt to escape famine and war. 
Protection work was extremely difficult, especially in Somalia, where access was limited and 
humanitarian agencies were often excluded. 
The Australian aid program supports work to improve the safety of people in humanitarian 
emergencies. Protection was the focus of 3 per cent of total funds. This protection work supported 
covered diverse initiatives from child-friendly spaces to refugee legal protection and prisoner welfare. 
In hindsight, more might have been done programmatically in the area of protection. The recently 
developed protection framework44 should help with future responses.  
Conclusion 
› Protection was an important issue in the crisis. 
5.6 Recovery and resilience 
Australian funding was not split into emergency and recovery work. While it was not intended to 
specifically fund recovery or ‘early recovery’ work, a significant proportion of funding, especially that of 
NGOs, was used in this way. As previously noted, the Dollar for Dollar Initiative was not launched until 
November 2011—well after the peak of the famine—which meant it largely supported recovery work.  
The fact that Australia’s funding helped people get back on their feet is inherently good. Famine and 
food insecurity is characterised by distressed selling of assets before people start to starve. This 
means that even when people have been ‘saved’ by food or cash distributions or by specialist medical 
care, they remain extremely vulnerable. Affected people need to regain and hold assets to establish 
livelihoods. Recovery is also often the hardest phase to secure funding, as it occurs after the major 
crisis and can be expensive.  
The proportion of Australian funds directed to the recovery phase could not be determined as 
agencies do not record expenditure in this way and there is no industry standard in defining the three 
phases of humanitarian responses—emergency life-saving assistance; care and maintenance (where 
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people are in refugee or displaced people camps—not in danger of starving but dependent on aid); 
and recovery.  
In future responses, especially in situations where loss of assets or income is a major factor in 
vulnerability, Australia should consider reserving some funding to assist recovery. Even with limited 
funding the argument for helping people recover is strong; when there are more funds available such 
an approach is consistent with best practice. Requiring agencies to be transparent about how the 
funds received are used in terms of emergency response or recovery would help in making such 
allocations and in reporting back to the public. 
The aftermath of traumatic events such as war and famine can create opportunities for change, which 
builds resilience. Pre-existing social protection programs in Ethiopia and Kenya built resilience, which 
mitigated some of the consequences of the crisis. In 2012, Australia made a $30-million contribution 
to the Kenyan Hunger Safety Net Programme, alongside a much larger grant from the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development. Through this program, people are assisted with cash and 
if there is devastating drought, as there was in 2011, it can surge to meet additional demand. This 
grant is somewhat outside the terms of reference of this evaluation but through building resilience it 
is likely to be a sound investment.  
Conclusions 
› Funds were not specifically allocated to recovery but a portion of Australian funding was used for 
recovery activities.  
› The investment in the Kenya Hunger Safety Net Programme is potentially a good investment in 
resilience, offering the potential of reducing the impact of future crises. 
 
Recovery work included working with local communities to provide advice and cash grants to support 
improved irrigation and farming. Photo: Kenya Red Cross.
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6 Achievements of Australian assistance 
Key questions 
 
› How many lives were saved and how many people were assisted?  
› Which aspects of the response provided best value for money?  
› Overall, how well did Australian assistance align with good humanitarian donorship principles? 
 
This evaluation has concluded that Australia’s assistance in the Horn of Africa (HoA) was in keeping 
with the scale of the crisis. However, unless the Australian public is assured of the efficacy of aid, and 
not just its morality, the consensus underpinning such large actions may not survive. 
Estimation of the impact of Australia’s response to the HoA crisis is challenging and technically 
imprecise. The data do not exist on which to make a rigorous judgement. Results are assessed in 
terms of the number of people assisted, value for money and alignment with good humanitarian 
donorship principles. The number of people helped was estimated from the overall impact of the 
international response and the numbers of beneficiaries reported by implementing partners. 
6.1 Impact of the international response 
The HoA crisis provides evidence that aid works (and that the counterfactual is true—withdrawing aid 
can have harmful consequences). The withdrawal of large aid volumes in 2010 was a significant 
factor in the subsequent Somali famine.45 The fact that Somalia’s neighbours (Kenya and especially 
Ethiopia) who continued to receive assistance did not suffer so acutely also shows that aid and safety 
nets work.46 
The reduction of mortality in Somalia following resumption of large aid volumes after the declaration 
of famine also suggests strongly that humanitarian aid can save lives. In Somalia, the famine has 
recently been estimated to have caused many deaths from May and July 2011 (Figure 7). The 
humanitarian response rapidly scaled up from the end of July when famine was declared. In Somalia 
as a whole, the number of deaths due to the famine (the number of excess deaths) was already 
reduced by August and then declined further. Famine was not prevented but humanitarian assistance 
may have cut it short and rendered some people less vulnerable.  
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Figure 7 Mortality and funding to the United Nations consolidated appeal process for Somalia 
 
CAP = consolidated appeal process 
Source: Redrawn from F Checchi & W Courtland Robinson, Mortality among populations of southern and central Somalia affected by 
severe food insecurity and famine during 2010–2012. a study commissioned by FAO/FSNAU and FEWS NET from the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health, 
2013. 
While Australian assistance to WFP was probably not a major factor in the initial reductions in 
mortality in Somalia in August, it certainly would have been significant in later reductions. World Food 
Programme (WFP) began scaling up in August 2011, partly as a result of receiving Australian support. 
By the end of August, WFP was beginning to be operational in border areas and Mogadishu, reporting 
it had delivered tonnes of food commodities, high-energy biscuits, maize and oil, as well as 
Plumpy’Sup (a ready-to-use supplementary food developed for the treatment of moderate acute 
malnutrition in children more than 6 months old). By September, WFP was reporting that general food 
distribution, wet feeding, institutional feeding and a targeted supplementary feeding program were 
underway.  
In Mogadishu, reductions in mortality also coincided with the resumption of humanitarian assistance. 
Humanitarian operations in Mogadishu scaled up after the departure of Al-Shabaab in August.47 A 
well-funded mortality study in Mogadishu produced the most reliable mortality data for Somalia 
(Figure 8). This study found that, by September, mortality rates had fallen or were starting to fall for 
residents and internally displaced people in or around Mogadishu. The Afgoye corridor in the Shabelle 
valley is a previously rural area outside Mogadishu that became home to the largest single 
concentration of internally displaced people in the world in 2010–11. Australia’s contribution to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross in August 2011, which supported food distribution in areas 
of great need including the lower Shabelle valley in south-central Somalia, would also have helped 
reduced mortality. 
The Australian humanitarian response to refugees outside Somalia was also lifesaving. The refugee 
response was effective in Kenya but took time to scale up in Ethiopia. In Kenya, Australia supported 
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refugees through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and through food 
provided by WFP.  
Figure 8 Estimated excess monthly mortality in and around Mogadishu throughout 2011 
 
IDPs = internally displaced persons 
Source: Adapted from: F Checchi & WC Robinson, Mortality among populations of southern and central Somalia affected by severe 
food insecurity and famine during 2010–12. A study commissioned by FAO/FSNAU and FEWS NET from the London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2013. 
Caution is needed in making an optimistic interpretation of the mortality figures. Although reductions 
in mortality rates fell from July onwards when the international humanitarian response increased, it 
may not have been the only factor in the decline. Many of the weakest might have already died, 
meaning that mortality may have declined to some extent without intervention.  
6.2 Partner reporting on results 
This evaluation invested considerable time and effort in trying to obtain accurate results from 
implementing partners. The lack of agreed definitions and a framework for results, either 
internationally or within the Australian aid program, means that there is wide variation in what is 
called a ‘result’. This evaluation used the metric of ‘people reached’ in attempting to quantify results. 
‘People reached’ is not, on its own, technically a ‘result’ as it says nothing about whether the 
assistance was useful. It is assumed that people who were reached benefited from the assistance 
they received.  
Number of beneficiaries 
The reporting formats of both the HPA and Dollar for Dollar Initiative asked funded non-government 
organisations (NGOs) for beneficiary numbers. Estimation of beneficiary numbers in the HoA crisis 
was complicated, as people were severely affected and had many needs. For example, a family 
fleeing famine and war in south-central Somalia and arriving in Mogadishu would have needed 



































































































needed nutritional support and health care. Individual agencies may or may not have reduced 
beneficiary counts to allow for people who received multiple forms of assistance. 
Estimates of beneficiary numbers are also complicated because some people benefit directly whereas 
others benefit indirectly. For example, an NGO that supplied water in a project funded through the 
Humanitarian Partnership Agreement (HPA) listed the entire population of the district as beneficiaries. 
The Dollar for Dollar Initiative reporting format was perhaps more useful than that of the HPA, 
because it asked for numbers of both direct and indirect beneficiaries. The difficulty in estimating 
beneficiary numbers is illustrated by assistance provided in refugee camps. It is quite likely that 
everyone in the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya was helped in some way by the $15 million that 
Australia provided to UNHCR (perhaps through a water system provided, their garbage being collected 
or a visit to a clinic). Does this mean that all 494 651 people in the camp should be counted as 
beneficiaries?  
Grant agreements with United Nations (UN) agencies and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) did not require specific reporting on numbers of beneficiaries reached with Australian 
assistance. As a result, UN agencies did not provide numbers of beneficiaries of Australian 
assistance. Beneficiary numbers are estimated from the total beneficiary numbers reported by the 
agency and the percentage of agency funds provided by Australia. 
The number of beneficiaries for each agency is shown in Figure 9. Most of the beneficiaries of UN and 
ICRC funding were in Somalia. In contrast, about half of the beneficiaries of NGOs were in Kenya, a 
quarter was in Somalia and another quarter was in Ethiopia. 
Aggregation of beneficiary numbers 
The aggregated beneficiary numbers for Australian assistance by type of agency are shown in 
Figure 9. When results for all agencies are combined, Australian assistance is estimated to have 
benefited 3.7 million people. This is a quarter of those in need, with Australian funds being less than 
a twentieth of the total funds used in the crisis.  
Aggregating beneficiary counts from different agencies and donors tends to overestimate the total 
number of people reached so that the counts may exceed total number of people in need of 
assistance. Overestimation is inevitable as it is not possible to make adjustments for beneficiaries 
receiving multiple forms of assistance when it is provided by different agencies and funded by 
multiple donors. A family in a refugee camp may be provided the tent through Australian funding to 
UNHCR, food funded by the United States, clothes funded by the United Kingdom, nutritional care 
funded by Sweden, cooking equipment funded by Turkey and so on.  
The Australian aid program has quite logically adopted the phrase ‘instance of life-saving assistance’ 
to try to resolve this dilemma. However, through this way of tallying results, the Australian aid program 
concluded it had achieved 6 493 922 ‘instances of life-saving assistance’, which is equivalent to 
about half those estimated to be in need of assistance. Better ways to quantify results are needed. 
The overall effectiveness of humanitarian responses could be examined using broad public health 
indicators to make judgements about whether populations overall were stabilised and ultimately 
recovered. This might also include economic indicators for the recovery phase of the aftermath of an 
emergency. Indicators would be measures of what the agency set out to achieve, which in turn would 
be connected to what was achievable.  
Against the backdrop of public scrutiny of aid, the continued inability of the humanitarian sector to 
reliably measure outcomes and impact is unsatisfactory. One aspect of this has to be donor 
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behaviour, and the resources available for this measurement. Studies such as the mortality study 
conducted by John Hopkins University, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and UN Food 
and Agriculture Organization48 are costly and require interagency collaboration. Donors working 
together to fund such studies or data collection can yield high-value information.  
Figure 9 Number of beneficiaries of Australian assistance by agency 
 
CHF = UN Common Humanitarian Fund; FAO = UN Food and Agriculture Organization; ICRC = International Committee of the Red 
Cross; OCHA = UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; UNHCR = UN High Commission for Refugees; UNICEF = UN 
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NGO funds reach 1,156,859 beneficiaries
UN funds reach 2,327,226 beneficiaries
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Conclusions 
› Partners did not provide sufficiently detailed reporting to allow the Australian aid program to 
adequately determine what had been achieved with Australian funding. 
› It is difficult to estimate the numbers of people, but it is clear that lives were saved and Australian 
aid reached many people.  
› There is currently no reliable framework for estimating results of humanitarian responses, either 
internationally or within the Australian aid program. 
› The use of mortality, morbidity and public health data are potentially more useful for policy-
makers and taxpayers than number tallies. 
6.3 Value for money 
Donors, including Australia, have begun to focus on value for money in humanitarian action. This 
evaluation attempted to determine if any conclusions could be made about value for money for 
Australian assistance in the HoA. The analysis was limited to a simple cost-per-beneficiary method, as 
these were the only data available. Even these data were not available for UN agencies.  
Review of the crude cost-per-beneficiary showed it to be flawed as a measure of value for money, 
because it does not compare like with like. The analysis did, however, identify factors that are of 
general relevance in attempts to develop measures of value for money:  
› Costs depend on context: The cost of goods and services differ according to availability, transport, 
taxation and so on. Providing services in a location close to a major urban area is almost certainly 
cheaper than providing them in remote areas. Security is a huge cost, so delivering assistance in 
conflict-affected areas will invariably be relatively expensive. Costs per beneficiary for projects in 
Ethiopia were on average ‘cheaper’ than for projects in Kenya and Somalia (averages: Ethiopia 
$13.80, Somalia $23.89 and Kenya $39.21).  
› Costs reflect the type of assistance: The type of assistance provided clearly has an impact on 
costs. For example, the cost for an individual to attend a session on hand-washing is much less 
than the cost of a medical procedure.  
› Different forms of humanitarian action have different values: Some forms of humanitarian action 
have a greater ‘value’ than others. For instance, critical medical treatment is probably of greater 
value than clothing. These two actions are also vastly different in cost. The use of a simple cost-
per-beneficiary metric therefore could end up prioritising lower cost programs that do not 
necessarily have the same impact. 
› Value depends on outcomes not outputs or inputs: The cost-per-beneficiary calculations are 
typically made on an input basis (i.e. the value of things bought divided by the number of people 
they are nominally supposed to help), rather than an output (i.e. whether people actually received 
these items) or outcome basis (whether they were effective). If a commodity is not delivered to 
the intended recipient at the time it is needed, it does not represent good value for money. 
Examples of this are items that sit in a warehouse until after the crisis, seeds that miss the 
planting season or water pumps that do not work.  
Inputs are typically used as they are easier to quantify than outcomes. The difficulty of estimating 
outcomes means that reporting typically uses measures related to desired outcomes. This can be 
illustrated by the Oxfam cash transfers in Kenya. As improved nutritional status could not be 
measured, the proportion of household food expenditure the payment represented and the 
diversity in diets was reported.  
Outcomes reflect the quality of inputs and how well they match needs. Clearly water that is clean 
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has more value than contaminated water. Providing clean water is only valuable if it is not already 
available.  
› Numbers can be positively interpreted: The lack of clarity from all humanitarian donors about 
value for money means that agencies are able to, and some may feel obliged to, combine 
expensive interventions with low-cost programs that reach large numbers of beneficiaries to lower 
the cost per beneficiary.  
› Gathering information is difficult in challenging places: In a context such as Somalia, independent 
implementation is almost impossible and independent monitoring even more challenging and 
costly. Estimates of beneficiary numbers will be less accurate in such contexts. 
Clearly, more work is needed before meaningful measures of value for money in humanitarian action 
can be made. There is a need to define different categories of intervention by their worth, give 
resources to agencies to measure outputs and outcomes as well as inputs, and independently 
scrutinise reporting. Furthermore, past performance in terms of value for money is not necessarily an 
indicator of future performance, which is largely influenced by context and the competence of the 
teams in charge. 
Several agencies have started to build a ‘library’ of costs of different types of humanitarian action 
from one emergency to another. This will facilitate rational review of whether interventions are good 
value and which interventions should be pursued. Australia should review the work of donor agencies, 
such as the United Kingdom Department for International Development and the European Community 
Humanitarian Office, that have these libraries to see whether this or similar work would be of value to 
the Australian aid program.  
Conclusions 
› Value for money is not a well-developed concept in humanitarian action and, as a result, is not 
systematically measured or reported on. 
› Cost per beneficiary is not useful as a measure of value for money. 
› Australian aid needs to have a model of ‘value’ including factors such as timeliness and quality, 
and considering outcomes, not just inputs or outputs. Resourcing measurement and oversight is 
an important aspect of this. 
› A ‘library’ of costs might allow Australia to compare like with like, although this may be costly and 
time consuming to maintain. 
6.4 Alignment with principles of good humanitarian donorship  
Good humanitarian donorship is a concept and approach that was agreed among 17 donors 
(including Australia) in Stockholm in 2003. The agreement centred on a set of principles to guide 
donor behaviour.49 The 23 principles are grouped by the principles of humanitarian assistance, 
general principles, good practice in funding, standards setting and accountability. 
This evaluation rated Australia’s HoA response based on the 23 principles of good humanitarian 
donorship (Table 7). A simple numerical score was used, with 2 representing compliance, 
1 representing partial compliance and 0 no compliance. A score above two-thirds was deemed good 
or excellent, and below adequate or poor. 
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Table 7 How Australia assistance performed against good humanitarian donorship principles  
Principles area Compliance Performance (score) 
Humanitarian principles Excellent 6/6 
General principles Adequate (need to drive accountability 
and resilience) 
8/12 
Funding Good 7/8 
Promoting standards and enhancing 
implementation 
Good 9/12 
Learning and accountability Adequate (need to push transparency 
and support sector learning) 
4/6 
 
Overall, Australian humanitarian assistance in the HoA was found to be well aligned with the 
principles of good humanitarian donorship. Australia scores well in its approach to humanitarian 
principles, funding and the application of standards, but less well in accountability and learning. This 
reflects the findings of this evaluation that Australia was extremely responsive and provided 
appropriate levels of funding, but was less able to follow up—especially to monitor aid flows and 
agency performance. 
Conclusion 
› Australian assistance well aligned with the principles of good humanitarian donorship in all areas 




1 DFAT should develop procedures for responding to slow-onset humanitarian crises. 
i. A simple activation mechanism that identifies which section is in the lead and the likely 
level of financial commitment. 
ii. A strategy development process that sets priorities, targets specific outcomes, shapes the 
funding portfolio and identifies activities distinct from funding needed to increase the 
effectiveness of Australian assistance. 
iii. Key elements of a staffing plan with an appropriate surge capacity to ensure requisite 
human resources to deliver and monitor humanitarian assistance. The plan should include 
support for staff to deal with the stresses of their work, as well as monitoring of workloads 
and wellbeing of staff by individuals not involved in the response.  
2 DFAT should develop clear measures of success for humanitarian action and ensure that 
arrangements with partners include specific reporting against these measures. 
i. Identify measureable indicators for strategic outcomes, such as food security, protection 
and resilience.  
ii. Work with partners to develop better outcome monitoring systems and to ensure more 
equitable outcomes for ethnic minority groups, women and children.  
iii. Set out reporting requirements in formal agency-level grant agreements with implementing 
partners, especially United Nations agencies. This reporting should include detailed 
financial accounting, as well as specific reporting on outputs and outcomes achieved. 
iv. Work with key partners to develop thinking about value for money in humanitarian action. 
Consider developing a ‘library’ of costs that can be used as benchmarks for programming 
in various contexts.  
3 DFAT should continue to build humanitarian cadre and expertise.  
i. Increase in-house knowledge in key areas that are essential to understanding and 
responding to slow-onset crises, notably early warning, early action, resilience and 
multiyear funding. 
ii. Identify the most appropriate types and level of technical specialism and niche roles for 
the Australian aid program in chronic food and protracted conflict emergencies, and 
improve and increase skills in these areas.  
iii. Continue to invest in policy and advocacy capacity to engage with the humanitarian 
system, contributing to its overall effectiveness. 
iv. Ensure there are sufficient geographical humanitarian positions to be prepared for spikes 
in crises. 
v. Adapt surge-capacity arrangements to bring in humanitarian skills to support programs 
dealing with slow-onset emergencies at short notice. 
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4 DFAT should continue to improve the quality, timeliness and focus of its operations, changing 
emphasis as evidence proves the efficacy of new or amended approaches. 
i. Routinely consider options for cash-transfer programming and ensure partners consider 
this as a first rather than a last option. Ensure cash is targeted at women where 
appropriate. 
ii. Devolve decision-making to humanitarian and geographical professionals on technical 
issues where possible, and to Post and field teams where there is sufficient capacity. 
iv. Continue to investigate with others how early warning data can be translated into early 
and appropriate action. 
5 DFAT should develop strategies to better mobilise resources in response to slow-onset 
humanitarian crises.  
i. In partnership with Australian Council for International Development and the private 
sector, explore innovative public fundraising and outreach that builds on the success of 
the Dollar for Dollar Initiative. 
ii. Examine options for a mechanism like the Humanitarian Partnership Agreement that can 
be adapted to different contexts and geographic locations. 
iii. Continue to use pooled funding–type arrangements such as the United Nations Common 
Humanitarian Fund, but work with the United Nations to speed up disbursal. 
iv. Develop new mechanisms, or modify existing ones, to fund non-government organisations 
directly, including those without an Australian base, where they are clearly the best placed 
to deliver lifesaving assistance. 
v. Ensure that the speed of disbursal seen in the Horn of Africa crisis is maintained. 
6 DFAT should increase humanitarian liaison capacity in regions outside the traditional geographic 
focuses of the aid program. 
i. Strengthen working relationships with humanitarian counterparts in other donor missions 
to identify division of labour opportunities, including options for delegated cooperation 
and/or shared resources. 
ii. Invest in coordination at a country level, either through direct hosting arrangements (as 




Abbreviations and acronyms 
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development, integrated into DFAT from 
November 2013 
CHF United Nations Common Humanitarian Fund  
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government 
FAO UN Food and Agriculture Organization  
FEWS NET Famine Early Warning System Network  
FSNAU Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit 
HoA Horn of Africa 
HPA Humanitarian Partnership Agreement  
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
NGO non-government organisation 
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
ODE Office of Development Effectiveness 
RRT rapid response team  
UN United Nations 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
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